

6. General Sikorski, under constant fire from the Opposition and having at the same time to consider his relations with the U.S.S.R., alternated his declarations—"A great deed is being said about Eastern Poland I did not, and shall not, barter Polish soil! I defend and shall defend Polish soil!" then, "I am a realist, and that is why I believe that we should come to an understanding with our eastern neighbour." It is little wonder that the public was confused as to what he really did mean. But behind all this, in reports of his private conversations and the discussions he had with leaders of American Lithuanians, Ukrainians and Jews, there emerges the conclusion that he was not displeased by the very vocal Opposition—that, in fact, that Opposition was saying what he himself wished to say, but which was clearly impossible for him. It cannot be imagined that the Opposition was long unaware of the anti-Russian views the General expressed in private, since news, and in particular supposedly secret news, travels fast in this country. It is reasonable to suppose, therefore, that out of the apparent disunity there came that unity which he desired, but to which he could not give public expression. The Russians were, of course, fully informed of the whole matter.

7. In his discussions with Lithuanian leaders in Chicago, General Sikorski is reported to have put forward two alternative views:—

- (a) If Russia should insist on a frontier based on the "Curzon Line," then Poland would favour a Baltic federation of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.
- (b) If Poland regained her 1939 frontier, she would not object to Latvia and Estonia being incorporated with Russia. On the basis of the confidence which the General reportedly expressed to the Lithuanians that Poland would be able to return to her 1939 eastern frontier, he advised the Lithuanians to pursue a line of action independently of that of the Latvians and the Estonians.

With regard to the west, he proposed that Lithuania should claim Memel, Tilsit and Insterburg up to the frontiers of Eastern Prussia, since Poland would receive East Prussia, including Königsberg.

8. Since General Sikorski's departure there has been considerable speculation in Polish circles on the possibility of his visiting Moscow soon. It is said that if agreement can be brought about regarding the transfer of 90,000 Polish soldiers from Russia to the Near East and Russian recognition of the Polish citizenship of some half a million Poles from White Russia and the Ukraine, this will create a favourable atmosphere for discussion of the Polish-Russian frontier. It is said that General Sikorski will propose the incorporation of Lithuania into Poland, in which case Poland would support the Russian claim to Latvia and Estonia. A modified Curzon Line would be agreed, giving all Polish territory east of it to Russia and giving Lwow to Poland. There will be an exchange of populations, so that no Poles will be left in the U.S.S.R. and no Ukrainians or White Russians in Polish territory. Russia would then support the Polish claims to East Prussia, including Königsberg. I understand that M. Bilmanis, the Latvian Minister in Washington, was most indignant over General Sikorski's intrigues with the Lithuanians, and considers that Latvia and Estonia are only pawns which Poland is prepared to sacrifice to Russia provided she gets Lithuania. M. Bilmanis is said to have been so irritated that his usual hostility towards the U.S.S.R. was by contrast abated, and he went so far as to say that at least under Russian rule the native language and culture would be preserved and not exterminated as it would be if Latvia were to be under Polish rule.

9. It is reported that in the General's talks with the Yugoslav Ambassador M. Fotic was opposed to the idea of a Central European federation. His anxiety was not only on account of the antagonism which the plan would arouse in the U.S.S.R., but because it would mean an independent Croatia. With regard to the Russians' attitude towards it, there is a good deal of wishful thinking in Polish circles to the effect that Russia will be so exhausted after the war that she will accept the conditions put to her by the United States and Great Britain.

10. It has been hard to discover what course was taken in the conversations between General Sikorski and the Ukrainians, but it is of interest that he talked with the editor of the Ukrainian Nationalist paper, *Svoboda*, M. Myousha, who is, and always has been, anti-Russian. Up to the time of America's entry into the war he was in close touch with Fascist Ukrainian organisations.

11. With regard to the conversations which General Sikorski had with leading Jews, I understand that the report on this prepared by Security