

levies an import duty upon the manufactured goods and other products of other countries, and that iron and steel products are especially subjected to these duties. The tariff on iron rails in the leading Continental countries of Europe was as follows in 1869: France, \$11.91 per ton of 2,240 pounds; Germany, \$12.19; Austria, \$24.38; Russia, \$9.74.

If it be argued that these duties are not levied for protection, but for revenue, we answer that all or nearly all of the duty-paying articles compete with articles which are produced by the countries which impose the duties, and that the policy of free trade means the *free* exchange of commodities between nations. If neither the principle nor the practice of free trade is adopted by the countries of Continental Europe, then they can not in any sense be properly claimed as its converts, even in part. Protection and revenue are not incompatible elements in the formation of a customs tariff; but free trade and revenue from customs are absolutely incompatible when one country exchanges with another products that are common to both. There may be revenue, but there is no free trade. The tariffs of Continental Europe embody the principles of protection and revenue in a majority of cases where duties are levied on commodities which compete with home productions; but where these duties are so high as to preclude the presumption that they are intended to encourage even moderate imports, the principle of protection only is preserved. France, Russia, and some of the other countries named in Mr. Walker's tables are examples of the imposition of such high duties. But France, which has been remarkably consistent in her devotion to the protective policy since the days of the first Napoleon, has gone further than this—gone further than the United States has ever gone. France has positively *prohibited*, and does now prohibit, in her general tariff the importation of many articles which her own people can produce. The United States can not export to France to-day, upon any conditions whatever, refined sugars, tobacco for private account, certain kinds of cast and forged iron, cutlery, copper in certain forms, certain chemical products, common soaps, fine stoneware and earthenware, glass bottles, goblets, etc. The revenue which France derives from these prohibitory duties is not apparent, but the protection which her manufacturers derive from some of them is plain. Her tariff is eminently a protective one, as is her whole fiscal system. A bounty to the exporters of French sugar encourages its production by facilitating its introduction into foreign markets.

But Great Britain herself is not the consistent and zealous devotee