

multiplied a thousand fold by the unwearied and unceasing generosity that has ever been displayed by the mother country to her subjects in these provinces, especially those of this peninsula; and not the least of the boons, for which we remain debtors, is the readiness ever shewn to secure and enlarge our civil and political liberty on all occasions when we have made known our wishes. But if we, in the colony, have been gainers, the question has sometimes been put whether the benefit has been reciprocal.

It is not so long ago, but that some living can remember when the doctrine was universally received, that '*Ships, colonies and commerce*' were important, nay indispensable elements in the dignity, success and security of an empire. No one can imagine for a moment, that the British nation could have emerged from the tremendous struggle of her wars with the French republic and the emperor Napoleon 1st, unless supported by these three great auxiliaries. What calculations the political economist might prepare on the advantage or disadvantage of colonies in the abstract, we need hardly conjecture. It is to be borne in mind, however, that in the years from 1793 to 1815, the fact that England held firm and undisputed possession of these provinces, ensured to her navies and armies a home and a resort on this side of the Atlantic, and essentially contributed to render that mighty ocean virtually a locked-up British lake. While her fleets could flaunt the ancient banner of St. George from Newfoundland in the North, to cape Horn and the cape of Good hope in the South, undismayed and unassailed:—while the fleets of France and Spain lay hermetically sealed up in the ports of Brest, Cherbourg, Toulon, Cadiz or Corunna; while the commercial shipping, not only of France herself but of her subject allies of Holland, Spain and Italy, were excluded from the seas by the triumph-