

External Affairs

these matters the Atlantic powers and the nations of the commonwealth can help in the material and in the technical sphere.

Aid to the east should therefore take three forms. The first is essential to give that financial and economic support without which we cannot hope to create conditions that can successfully withstand the challenge of communism. Second, some military help will be necessary in the form of military missions, arms and equipment. Here close co-ordination between neighbouring countries is urgently needed. Third, there should be an agreed strategy in all this area between the powers principally concerned, and their burden both in troops and political responsibility fairly adjusted.

It is equally necessary that our several intelligence services in the Far East should be reviewed and co-ordinated.

I therefore repeat that the most urgent need is for us to have a common policy in these affairs. No nation can, by itself, save the Far East.

Our common policy must be founded upon determination to help the peoples of southeast Asia to live in freedom from want or fear. Without our aid they are doomed to all the consequences of communist rule, and if they should fall, who can doubt that the danger to the peace of all the world would move nearer and yet nearer to home?

That is the complete quotation from the great wartime foreign secretary of Great Britain. I might say that appeared, as I have read it, in the *New York Times* of January 20, 1950, a paper that I believe will be regarded by everyone as a completely reliable publication.

When the Secretary of State for External Affairs, in a rather jaunty manner, talks about the difficulties that he has encountered when he makes general statements and then tries to follow them up with positive statements, he is quite competent to speak for himself. I have no doubt that is an accurate description of the situation in which he usually finds himself; but I followed with the very clear statement that here was the answer to the problem. This was not a statement made before there was British recognition. When he suggests that British recognition and the recognition of India, Pakistan and other countries makes it impossible now to have a uniform pattern, he is challenging the common sense and accuracy of the statement of Mr. Anthony Eden, which I have read, in regard to this very subject; because these other recognitions had been made at the time that this positive statement was made.

Let me deal with some of these points that have been brought up today—because this is not a situation that can be disposed of by quibbling or by badinage. It is a subject that, as has been pointed out by Mr. Anthony Eden, presents a critical challenge to the whole world at this hour. It should be the first concern of this parliament and of the government of Canada to recognize that, if this critical situation should lead to an explosion, then our full compliance with every other undertaking we have accepted, and our full

[Mr. Drew.]

and wholehearted support of the Atlantic pact, will have proved completely unavailing to preserve that peace which is the aim of every sensible person in this country and of every thoughtful human being throughout the world.

I just want to make one point quite clear. I do not for a moment question the fact that the Secretary of State for External Affairs has acted in his official capacity with courtesy to the members of this house with whom he has dealt and to those who have no official positions, whether on the government side or on the other side of the house. I want one thing to be quite clearly understood. I have received no information from him on this subject which would adequately explain to me what knowledge the government now has in regard to this extremely important subject. The Secretary of State for External Affairs did present to me a memorandum dealing with the Chinese question, which was a confidential memorandum. He said it was top secret, and it was so marked. It was delivered to me on November 29, 1949. It was delivered before he was in the Orient, and incidentally before recognition had taken place by India, the United Kingdom, Pakistan or the other nations he has mentioned. A great deal has happened since that time—a very great deal. There has been a wholly changed situation in China and in the Orient. For one thing, there has been an agreement between the Mao regime and the Soviet union. I was under the impression it was suggested that the government was not fully informed in regard to that agreement. Was I correct in that?

Mr. Pearson: Apparently there are secret clauses.

Mr. Drew: The reason I asked the question is that the whole text of the agreement was published on February 15 in the *New York Times*. There may be secret clauses, but there is a very full agreement which does indicate the nature of the thirty-year alliance that has been signed between the Soviet union and the Mao regime following some two months of negotiation in Moscow. And as I recalled the other night, there is a startling similarity between many of the terms in this agreement and those of the agreement that was signed on August 26, 1939, between Hitler's government and the government of Russia.

I would commend to the earnest consideration of those who are following the course of history the photograph that appeared in the *New York Times* of February 16. There they will see Mr. Stalin, Mr. Molotov and Mr. Vishinsky taking their part in the signing of this agreement in the presence of Mr. Mao.