those negotiations are consummated again in Geneva. I say to you what I think is palpably true: that could not have happened without the existence of an international agency through which ideological opposites can speak to each other, however obliquely. That is one of the great values of the United Nations.

And so to point number three: the question of some of the intransigent issues which seem to be so frustrating when we deal with them. Let me look at the most difficult of all, arms control and disarmament. Let me remind you, if I may, of the First Committee in the United Nations. Time and again, year after year, in what some would call a suffocating process – I would call a liberating intelligence – we deal with resolutions on a comprehensive test ban, on the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons, on the non-proliferation treaty, on the nuclear freeze, on nuclear winter, on a ban on fissionable materials, on the reduction of conventional arms – all of these resolutions, one after the other, addressed with vigour and passion and fervour by the countries involved. Yet, say the critics: you never achieve anything – resolution after resolution is passed and then not embraced by the superpowers. But the fact of the matter is that such a view of the process is both trivial and distorted, because whether it is in the First Committee in the fall, or whether it's in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, or whether it's in the United Nations Disarmament Commission in May here in New York, we keep the pressure on the superpowers. They have to vote, they have to take a stand, they have to meet and speak to every single one of those resolutions – it's absolutely inescapable – and that in itself, in a very important, if unacknowledged, way helps to maintain a glimmer of sanity in an otherwise lunatic environment. One should therefore applaud and recognize the value of those arms forums, even though we recognize as well that the ultimate decision will be made in Geneva.

Point number four: let me remind you of the emerging role of the Secretary-General. I think it's important to note what Edward Luck said: this is a new kind of Secretary-General; a man who is redefining the office in the contemporary world. We haven't seen his like since Dag Hammarskjold. And that's a terribly important thing to understand.

I had the pleasure of accompanying Pérez de Cuéllar on a three-day state visit to Canada in early March. He's an immensely impressive and formidable advocate one on one and in small groups. I observed him talking with my Prime Minister, with my Minister of External Affairs, with a number of senior public servants, and every time he met them in argument he did not retreat. He engages in an advocacy which is quite unrelenting and effective.

What it has done for Pérez de Cuéllar and the United Nations, I think, is to have created a sense of interventionist diplomacy on the one hand, and preventive diplomacy on the other, both of which are giving a new *raison d'être* to the United Nations system. It doesn't always work, of course. What in this world does? But I remind you that when Pérez de Cuéllar wanders off to Southeast Asia to try to deal with Kampuchea; when he deals with the Soviet Union and Pakistan over Afghanistan; when he makes visits to Iran and Iraq; when he deals with the parties in Cyprus; when he moves heaven and earth to sustain the Contadora process in Central America, what Pérez de Cuéllar is doing is bringing the force of his office under Section 99 of the Charter to bear in a way which is ultimately helpful and civilizing.

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