

suggested and some were strongly opposed to the whole concept. I think it is safe to say that it was only because of our insistence on this matter that the Conference addressed itself at all seriously to the matter. What finally emerged in Articles 6 and 7 of the Act was the most that could be obtained. Under these arrangements, the reports and views of the International Commission will at least be transmitted outside the closed circuit of the belligerents, to the Conference participants, and the Conference itself can be recalled.

I made clear to the Conference our disappointment that it could not agree on a more effective arrangement and I questioned whether the mechanism established went far enough and whether it could work. I emphasized to the Conference on March 1 that the arrangements provided in Articles 6 and 7 would be carefully reviewed by the Canadian Government in determining the extent to which our conditions for continued participation in the Commission had been fulfilled.

The Act provided an opportunity for World Powers to acknowledge their respect and support for the January 27 Agreement in association not only with the Parties to that Agreement but also with the Governments participating in the International Commission established under it. It is also noteworthy that the Conference was conducted in the presence of the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

I signed the Act on behalf of Canada because the spirit of the Act and the goodwill reflected in it were such as to command the support of the Canadian people. The Act welcomes peace in Viet-Nam and it calls for the participants to do nothing to jeopardize that peace. It was therefore, important to have all the participants at the Conference associated with those objectives, and failure to sign could have been open to misinterpretation. Moreover, not to have signed the Act could only have been construed as meaning that one of our sine qua non had not been met. We were not in a position at the Conference, nor are we yet in a position, to say whether the machinery provided in Articles 6 and 7 could serve the purpose we have had in mind. We will look at these arrangements in the light of our experience in the ICCS. This will be one of the prime factors in determining whether the Commission is playing or can play an effective role in restoring peace to Viet-Nam.

Mr. Speaker, we must now examine very carefully the political authority and the reporting arrangements that have been established to determine whether in our judgement, they have a reasonable prospect of operating effectively. We must also relate these arrangements to the effectiveness of the ICCS on the ground. The Canadian Delegation under the direction of Ambassador Gauvin is making a tremendous effort to see that the Commission works. But we cannot do it alone, Mr. Speaker, and disturbing developments in Viet-Nam compel us to question whether the ICCS will be allowed to function in a way that would justify our continued participation. Perhaps--and I cannot say that I am very confident--the discussions in Paris will result in increased