

The London Conference even translated into treaty form the controversial principle on the duty to consult, on which it had proved impossible to reach agreement at the Stockholm Conference, in Article 5 of that Convention, which makes clear that states wishing to avail themselves of the right to dump noxious wastes in an emergency situation must consult both with the proposed organization and with states likely to be affected by such action.

Similarly, the Stockholm principle on the duty of states to develop procedures for the determination of liability and compensation for such damage is translated into binding treaty form in the London Convention.

The Canadian delegation hopes and expects that the IMCO Conference, which will be considering both the control of intentional discharge of noxious waste from ships and the rights of coastal states to intervene on the high seas in certain emergency situations, will carry the Stockholm principles another step forward in translating legal principles into binding treaty obligations.

Thus we see here the phenomenon of a number of separate but interrelated conferences all leading towards the Law of the Sea Conference and, at the same time, the recurrent theme in all of these conferences of recognition of the need to preserve the marine environment, not merely through new rights of states but through the imposition of new duties upon states.

I can think of no more encouraging development for the future Law of the Sea. It is obvious that the Third Law of the Sea Conference can draw upon and build upon these precedents. It is equally obvious that all of these developments must be harmonized in one great global settlement.

In applying these new trends and emerging concepts to other basic issues requiring resolution at the Law of the Sea Conference, it seems evident that the embryo of an overall accommodation lies in agreement upon a very narrow band of coastal seas, subject to complete sovereignty and a wider band of specialized jurisdictions, extending as far as necessary to meet particular objectives, which in principle could have varied limits but in practice might well together comprise a single "economic zone" or "patrimonial sea". The narrow band of sovereignty or territorial sea could be established as extending only to 12 miles, as so many states, including my own, have already accepted. But no one should regard the figure "12", which is, after all, a simple multiple of three, as sacrosanct, and it may be that an even narrower, generally accepted limit might -- if coupled with the "economic zone" concept -- facilitate the resolution of this and other related difficulties, such as, for instance, passage through international straits.