

occasions, been instructed to present views contrary to those expressed by other members of the Western Five, whenever this seemed warranted. We would not hesitate to authorize the Canadian delegation to follow a similarly independent line again if circumstances so dictated. But for the present no such need exists, and M. Moch has rightly stressed the solidarity of the Western Five ... The Western Five advanced their proposals some time ago and indicated their willingness to enter upon detailed negotiations. The Eastern nations are now speaking in support of the new Soviet proposals of June 2, and have indicated that these provide a basis for negotiation. These latest proposals are now being further explained by the Eastern countries, partly as a result of questioning by the Western members of the Committee.

In the course of this clarification, on June 9, General Burns pointed to several examples of ways in which the new Soviet proposals represent an advance over earlier Soviet positions; for instance, with respect to the prohibition of weapons of mass destruction in outer space; the control over launching of rockets for peaceful purposes; the provision for a joint study of the cessation of production of nuclear weapons and destruction of stockpiles; and the inclusion of measures for peace-keeping machinery in accordance with the United Nations Charter. In making this statement, General Burns emphasized that the Canadian delegation wished to approach the new Soviet proposals in the most constructive way. He chose the examples I have mentioned because they are among the measures to which the Canadian Government attaches special significance.

It is my view that the time has come, perhaps through an examination of equivalent features of new Soviet proposals and the Western proposals, to begin a process of negotiation of balanced concessions. This was the sort of package approach to which I referred earlier in the House when I reported on the NATO Ministerial Meeting at Istanbul. I should like to emphasize, however, that by "package", I do not mean that the one side or the other should hold out for its present proposals on an all or nothing basis; the packages I have in mind, as I have tried to explain, are smaller and would contain provisions of equivalent significance to both sides. The goal would remain general and complete disarmament under effective international control, but it would be accomplished by a stage-by-stage process throughout which concessions would be balanced in such a way that neither side would obtain a temporary military superiority.

For the first time in these negotiations the Soviet delegation had admitted that there will have to be some sort of international machinery to maintain peace in a disarmed world. The proposals are also considerably more detailed and therefore less obscure than the proposals Mr. Khrushchov made to the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1959. They also make some provision for the initiation of a process of study before measures of disarmament