

A. US Counter-Force Strike 800 Minuteman Mark 12A warheads against 400 SS-18 and SS-19 targets.	
Minuteman III 12A Haro	$SSKP = 0.615 \qquad OAR = 80\%$ $Iness = 2,000 \text{ psi}$ $TKP = SSKP \times OAR$ $TKP = 0.49$
Probability of survival of targets	= $(1-\text{TKP}_1) \times (1-\text{TKP}_2)$ = $(0.51) \times (0.51)$ = $0.26$ = $26\%$
B. Soviet Counter-force strike: 1,000 SS-18 Mod 4 warheads against 500 US ICBM targets	
	SSKP = 0.654 OAR = 70% ness = 2,000 psi TKP = SSKP x OAR TKP = 0.46
Probability of survival of targets	= $(1-\text{TKP}_1) \times (1-\text{TKP}_2)$ = $(1-0.46) \times (1-0.46)$ = $0.30$ = $30\%$

In the American case, 800 Minuteman III Mark 12A warheads (267 missiles) are double targeted against the 400 SS-18 and SS-19 missiles which the Soviets would retain under the 3600 warhead limit. 104 missiles (or as many as 1040 warheads) would survive. In the Soviet case, 1000 SS-18 warheads (100 missiles) are double targeted against the 500 American ICBMs which would remain after force reductions. 150 missiles (or as many as 450 warheads) would survive. While there are many additional factors to be considered in such exchanges, it is clear that neither side would have the capability to eliminate the ICBM forces of the other under the reduction regime contemplated or, indeed, to deny a significant ICBM riposte.