

— were accepted by most Canadians, analysts, and allies, as striking an acceptable balance. There is a need in coming months to define where and how the remaining forces will fit, as well as coping with the major challenge of relocating, refocussing, and reducing existing forces.

Some other areas to be defined following the Government's September statement include: possible naval involvements in United Nations' activities; future military roles in asserting and protecting Canada's sovereignty in the Arctic; and exploration and definition of other possible "non-traditional" roles for Canada's armed forces.

Even more vital, from the perspective of effectiveness for Canada's reduced armed forces, is the Government's undertaking to increase the percentage of the budget allocated to procurement of equipment. To be realistic, however, this goal will depend on a determined reduction of defence infrastructure. And here the Government made only preliminary and tentative steps, probably because of the social and political sensitivities involved in closing more of Canada's surplus bases. The Advisory Committee set up on this subject was not yet, unlike its American counterpart, mandated to make concrete, "de-politicized" suggestions for rationalization in their reports to the Minister. Such a procedure would make real breakthroughs in rationalization, and together with serious adjustment strategies could reduce the ugly and divisive political battles as well as the serious human and economic dislocations which come with these hard decisions in Canada.

### c. Beyond the Porous Boundaries of "Europe"

Canadians have always assumed that the security functions of the Atlantic Alliance, of NATO, and of the CSCE and other groups in Europe are undertaken in pursuit of the purposes of the United Nations Charter, and under the provisions of its Chapter 8 which encourage regional security organizations to uphold these purposes. There has long been a widespread assumption that the UN itself would never be called upon to take a direct security role in Europe, but such action should not be excluded. Although the neighbours may have ample capacity to help settle disputes, mediate an end to conflict, or keep the peace, they may sometimes be *too close* to bring the required objectivity and neutrality between disputants. In these circumstances, as in past UN operations, the peacemaker from further away may have a special role to play — as Cyrus Vance has demonstrated in Yugoslavia — and there may also be advantages to peacekeepers from a distance.