

noted. A chemical weapons verification system might adopt a similar "reasonable fear of non-compliance" approach.

Inspections

The Agency's inspection procedures are relevant for a chemical weapons verification agency in a variety of ways. The Agency has worked out, with reference to a set of industrial processes, the requirements of record-keeping, reporting, surveillance and containment instruments, measurement and counting, and sampling procedures. These also include general limitations on the conduct of inspectors as well as on the rights of states and plant operators. There are also potentially educative provisions governing when materials shall come under safeguards, how and when they may be withdrawn from safeguards, and when safeguards may be terminated.¹¹ Beyond this level of technical detail, there are other lessons to be learned from the Agency's inspection systems.

The Agency has developed three types of inspections — ad hoc, routine, and special — depending on the circumstances of application. Ad hoc inspections are carried out for transfers of nuclear material into and out of a state, to verify initial quantities of material subject to safeguards, or to deal with changes in a facility since an initial report was made. Routine inspections are the regular safeguards inspections conducted by the Agency. Special inspections are carried out if additional information is needed. Each of these types has its own notice, access and procedural rules. The differentiation among types of inspection indicates that inspections may serve a variety of purposes, and that their requirements may vary accordingly. In addition, the concept of routine inspections reduces the aura of suspicion around inspections in general: because inspections are undertaken routinely, they do not necessarily imply suspicion of non-compliance. Routine inspections have the further advantage that they become incorporated into the ordinary operation of a plant, and thus become less disruptive.

Even special inspections need not imply suspicion, since they may be responses to other circumstances that indicate possible problems with containment measures. Therefore special inspections are not associated with the concept of challenge inspections, although there will be overlaps between the two, at least so far as inspections at declared facilities would be concerned. The possible adaptation of the Agency's special inspection procedures to challenge inspections, including at suspect but undeclared facilities, should be examined.

Depending on the amount of nuclear material at a facility, the intensity of Agency inspections will vary, from once a year to possibly continuous inspection. INFCIRC/66 allows some unannounced inspections, and INFCIRC/153 allows some inspections that are unannounced and planned on a