

ter, as in all others within their scope of duty, we have had no reason to complain, so far. But it is of the system *quoad hoc*, and its immediate tendencies that we complain, and to which we would draw attention. We are aware—for on several occasions it has been manifested—that in our legislative bodies—bodies of much mixed faiths—there is a general repugnance to touching the thing; and in consequence the old evil is left to itself. The argument *ex inconvenienti* comes into play. But, in the meantime the evil exists; and existing, grows. If a thing is bad and be left to itself, in its own corruption, whence—it may be asked—is that “progress” which Mr. Abbott speaks of to come and continue? To-day, we happen, happily, to have the light and weight of his Protestant advocacy in such argument; but when another—say the Hon. Senator, Mr. Scott, leader of the opposite party—a Roman Catholic, should have the leading of the House, what chance would there be for *any* Bill of Divorce? We question no man’s liberty of conscience. As we desire ours to be respected; so theirs; but in the higher and supreme matter of “public order,” as above explained, that higher law must prevail. What it dictates in such policy trenches on no conscience, for under it the individual is left free to act for himself. The doors of a Divorce Court may be open to all, and yet no one be obliged to resort to it against his will. If in fault against one entitled to such remedy, and using it, that is the penalty of his or her own sin. No “Sacrament” can cover civic crime.

To leave the matter—as now—entirely to a Parliament, so constituted, is, in effect, to bow the knee to an *imperium in imperio*, and an abnegation of British right and self-respect.

In these observations the writer is expressing only his own opinion; without suggestion from the work under notice. The author (Mr. Gemmill) is studiously reticent on these political points. His task has been rather that of the historian and reporter, and this he has done most admirably.

#### *Statistics of Divorce.*

Amongst other facts he gives a condensed statement of the Statistics of Divorce, the

world over. The general proportion in the United States is given (p. 259) as one in ten, of marriages, while in Canada (p. 257) it is, on an average during the last twenty years, “1 to 10, 222 married people”—so it is put—*i.e.* 1 in 5, 111 marriages. This, compared with European countries, viz., Italy, France, England and Wales, Denmark, Belgium, Holland, Sweden, Switzerland (highest, viz., 46 in 1,000), Wurtemberg, Saxony, Baden, Alsace-Lorraine, Hungary, and Russia, is abnormally low. One country alone is lower, viz., Scotland, where, since 1692, (if not long before) the Courts alone had jurisdiction, with right of appeal (after the Union) to the House of Lords in England, where, by the “Law Lords” (as a Court of Appeal) ultimate adjudication, according to the law of Scotland, vested. In Scotland the figures are decimal “.11 to .29 for each 1,000 (one thousand) “marriages”—say 2 in ten thousand marriages—four times less than in all Canada, including Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, British Columbia and all the other Provinces. In the three last named Provinces the matter is judicial; only in Ontario and Quebec, and we may add, Manitoba and the Northwest Territories is it not so. Prince Edward Island has the adjudication in the Lieutenant-Governor and Council, with power to the Governor to appoint the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court in his place.

Why Ontario should stand in so exceptional a position, we have not seen explained, but we can readily conceive that as an integral of Old Canada, she was restrained by the law of Lower Canada, as asserted by the dominant French of Lower Canada, and which, to this day, in its (Quebec) Code of Civil Law, is thus stated: “Article 185”—“Marriage can only be dissolved by the natural death of one of the parties: while both “live, it is indissoluble.”

That, in its dogmatism, is the dictate of Trent, denying divorce *à vinculo* under any circumstances, and practically ignoring all political considerations of status—civil status—involving in the question.

In so far as the divorced should not, according to Christ’s inculcation, marry any other during the life of both, there may, morally, and as a question of ethics, be indis-