

ack or possible invasion as we can reasonably be expected to make it, and that, should the occasion ever arise, enemy forces should not be able to pursue their way either by land, sea or air, to the United States across Canadian territory."

As can be seen, that statement of Prime Minister Mackenzie King already contained the substance of future arrangements for a joint defence of North America. The United States and Canada were thus well on the road that led, another two years later, to the Ogdensburg Agreement of August 17, 1940, and the institutionalizing of U.S.-Canadian defence co-operation by the creation of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence (PJBD). The "Permanent" in the name is important. Put in deliberately, as the relevant entry in the Mackenzie King diaries shows, it served as affirmation that looking jointly after the security of North America was then and would always remain, the only possible, because the only rational, course.

Principle established

The principle of joint defence was thus firmly established 36 years ago. Naturally enough, the methods of translating it into practice have undergone some changes through the years. No purpose would be served by describing them all, except to say that they were generally aimed at making the system work more efficiently and more economically under the conditions of the time and, on the political plane, at making it as palatable as possible to the smaller, and thus understandably more prickly, partner. Here, the problem was to make interdependence (which to many Canadians looked like dependence on the mighty United States) compatible with national sovereignty.

Canadian policy in this matter has been fairly consistent through the years. Prime Minister Trudeau spelt it out again in his programmatic statement on Canada's defence goals, of April 3, 1969: "We shall endeavour to have those activities within Canada which are essential to North American defence performed by Canadian forces." Nils Orvik, writing in the September/October 1973 issue of *Survival*, sees in this "do-it-yourself" policy the most effective means a small country has of saving itself from being "helped" by a powerful neighbour. What is involved is to persuade the latter that everything possible is being done to ensure his security, and that he does not have to force additional assistance upon a reluctant weaker partner. Professor Orvik, a Norwegian by birth, uses what happened to his homeland in 1940 as an example of

"defence against help" that was attempted but failed. For Second World War Germany, the safety of its northern flank in general, and the free movement of Scandinavian iron ore down the west coast of Norway into German ports in particular, were strategic essentials. Norway was doing its best to satisfy German security requirements, but Berlin always had its doubts about Norwegian capabilities, though perhaps not about Norwegian good will. The *Altmark* incident demonstrated the limitations of these capabilities. On the night of February 16-17, 1940, the German naval auxiliary vessel *Altmark* was caught in Jösing Fjord by a British destroyer, and the 300 or so British seamen she was carrying as prisoners were freed. Norway could do no more than protest the alleged violation of its neutrality. So the Germans took over the protection of the west coast route. In passing, they also invaded and occupied the whole of Norway.

The United States is not Nazi Germany. No drastic action need be feared in case Canada neglects to look after the glacies of "Fortress North America", even though Canadian capabilities also sometimes appear questionable. There are, however, other means, gentler but also effective, by which the United States could press, and probably would press, upon Canada its help in doing what it considered vital to its security, and it would be this help that would then affect Canadian sovereignty.

Lucky coincidence

Fortunately, specific Canadian security requirements largely coincide with wider North American security concern. In fact, the first two of the four defence priorities listed in the 1971 White Paper on defence overlap to a great extent. They are, respectively, "the surveillance of our own territory and coast lines, i.e. the protection of our sovereignty" and "the defence of North America in conjunction with U.S. forces". (The other two priorities are "the fulfilment of such NATO commitments as may be agreed upon" and "the performance of such international peace-keeping roles as we may from time to time assume".) Now, a Canadian maritime aircraft on off-shore patrol may search for submarines, but will also routinely look for vessels fishing in prohibited waters, ships trailing oil-slicks, icebergs and what not. In other words, the surveillance task, which is the principal one in time of peace, cannot be neatly packaged in one operation. It is difficult to see how Canadian sovereignty could be affected by doing so or, for that matter, by performing

Fortunate coincidence of security requirements