

peoples everywhere of an oppressive fear and of a very real danger.

**OTHER ADVANTAGES**

"It is also true that an observed nuclear-test treaty will constitute an impediment to the arms race for the quite simple reason that, without the indispensable step of operational testing, weapons technology cannot be significantly advanced. Thus a controlled international agreement would introduce an element of stability into the over-all armaments picture. It would make it difficult for additional nations to acquire a nuclear capability. It would also help to develop mutual confidence among those happily few great states which now possess nuclear arms. Such an agreement would be of immense value in providing a working model of a verification system, with possible applications in the disarmament field. Accordingly, it is to be expected that a nuclear-test treaty would have an important and beneficial psychological impact on the international climate generally and on East-West disarmament negotiations in particular.

"It will be readily seen that, while the suspension of tests is not a disarmament measure, it does, in fact, have a direct bearing on the vital question of national security. This is so because any treaty which might leave open the possibility that one side could with impunity conduct clandestine tests, thus perfecting its nuclear capability, would run the grave risk of encouraging the offending state to take a chance on aggression once it felt that a sufficient advantage had been gained from its hidden activities. Even if no state were in fact taking such advantage of its opportunity to cheat on an agreement, the situation would continue to be one of mutual suspicion. International tension, far from being eased, would remain acute.

"It is obvious that agreement on effective inspection and verification is fundamental to the conclusion of an international agreement to end tests. A very great responsibility, therefore, rests on the three negotiating countries to reach a mutually satisfactory solution of the control aspects of the treaty they are now drafting.

**MUTUALLY-ACCEPTABLE CONTROLS**

"What the negotiators must face squarely, not only in their own interests but in the interests of the United Nations as a whole, is the necessity of evolving an inspection system that will accord to each side equal certainty that a nuclear-test treaty will be observed. This is not a question of one or the other giving away something for nothing. The plain fact is that until a mutually-acceptable method of control is devised, the parties will continue to find it difficult to reach agreement on a treaty. So long as there is no international agreement, the world remains

under the very worrying threat that tests may be resumed, with all the fateful consequences that their resumption would entail. It is as much to the advantage of the nuclear powers as it is to the rest of the world that this possibility should not become a reality. Accordingly, we feel justified in expressing the strong hope that the negotiating countries will come soon to accept that it is very much in their mutual interests to devise adequate guarantees for the observance of the obligations incorporated in the nuclear test treaty.

"For something like two years the United Kingdom, the United States and the U.S.S.R. have voluntarily refrained from engaging in tests. We are all very grateful for this. But how much more comfortable it would be for all nations if they could be certain beyond any doubt that tests would never be resumed. In the past year France has entered the field of testing and, in the absence of agreement, seems disposed to go on with its programme of nuclear-arms development. Other states may be tempted to follow suit. Therefore, although the current moratorium among the Big Three is, of course, most welcome, it is an insufficient warranty either for them or for the world that there will be no more tests. As I have already stressed, that certainty will come only when the negotiating countries reach agreement on a treaty embodying such guarantees as to remove any doubt that it is being loyally implemented.

**NUCLEAR TESTS UNPOPULAR**

"World opinion at large is abundantly clear. Peoples everywhere are opposed to the further testing of nuclear weapons by any state. This has been, and continues to be, the unequivocal position of the Canadian Government. The Secretary of State for External Affairs has frequently in the past year, both in the Canadian Parliament and elsewhere, publicly stated Canadian opposition to further tests. Moreover, the Canadian Delegation at the fourteenth session last year unreservedly supported Sections A and B of Resolution 1402 and Resolution 1379.

**CANADA SUPPORTS INITIATIVES**

"Again this year the Canadian Government is glad of the opportunity to support two resolutions addressed squarely to the problem of nuclear tests. The first, in Document A/C.1/L.256, stands in the names of three non-nuclear powers - Austria, India and Sweden; the second, in Document 258, has been co-sponsored by some 26 non-nuclear powers. Both these initiatives are a tangible demonstration of how the non-nuclear countries can exert their influence in a field of vital concern both to them and to the large nuclear powers which have the responsibility for practical negotiations. It will be no secret to this Committee that my Delegation is always happy to see the smaller and middle powers playing a role which we have