

(Mr. Kosin, Yugoslavia)

Fourth, international conditions for accelerating negotiations have never been so favourable, as is demonstrated by the parallel negotiations on strategic, nuclear and conventional disarmament which are entering their final stage.

Fifth, from what is known of the degree of agreement in the American-Soviet bilateral negotiations, they can represent a significant impulse. We expect it to be directly reflected at the Conference on Disarmament. We also hope to get more fundamental information, in particular on all aspects connected with the elimination of all stocks of chemical weapons. These weapons must be permanently eliminated and their legalization cannot be accepted on any pretext, least of all through unilateral withdrawal from the convention.

We do not underestimate the difficulties and differences when speaking of such matters as verification, inspection (in particular challenge inspection), technological co-operation, the composition and method of decision-making of the Executive Council, etc. We are not neglecting the complexity of these difficulties, but we believe they can be solved quickly if we keep in mind the high level of political accord reached on basic aspects. We have in mind, above all, the fact that an effective verification system is taking shape, be it a question of routine inspection or ad hoc verification of chemical facilities. The development of the challenge inspection procedure and the verification of CW destruction has progressed well. In dealing with the inspection issues as a whole, it is essential to commence with the common interest of all States parties in establishing the facts by way of inspection, while the rest is logically a matter of the functioning of the mechanism which should ensure consistent implementation of the convention. One of the most important tasks is to provide for a complete ban on the use of chemical weapons during the 10-year transitional period following the entry into force of the convention. We regret that, although strongly reiterated in the Paris Declaration, the question of the prohibition of use has not been introduced in the mandate of the Ad hoc Committee.

The composition of the Executive Council and the decision-making process in it are among the important unresolved and, as yet, least elaborated questions. It seems that the starting-point for solving these questions should be that the implementation of the convention will presuppose full co-operation on the part of the Executive Council with all the States parties, which underlines its operational and co-ordinative role. We think it also important to establish adequate communication with the United Nations.

Of great concern, however, is the fact that the problem of the security of non-aligned and under-developed countries, especially when dealing with technological co-operation and assistance in the event of the use or threat of use of chemical weapons, is not being given sufficient attention. It is not necessary to keep on proving that countries which do not possess chemical weapons, or have renounced them, will for a long time be in an unequal economic and security position. To solve these issues it is essential to state the principles of co-operation and solidarity. Universal accession to the convention can be achieved only if it becomes a truly multilateral instrument that respects the quality of all its members, with an efficient and cost-effective implementation mechanism.