

announced flights through the zone for purposes of arms control verification,¹⁶² just as the test-launching of certain ballistic missiles beyond national borders is already subject to prior notification under the terms of the SALT agreements.

In rejecting the Soviet START proposal for heavy bomber “exclusionary zones,” former US negotiator and ACDA official Michael Mobbs later complained that they “in practice would burden the United States more than the Soviet Union, given the global nature of U.S. interests and responsibilities . . . the United States in effect would be cut off from many of its allies and from regions vital to its security, while the Soviet Union would not be similarly constrained.”¹⁶³ This would certainly be true if such aircraft were confined to their own national airspace, as in earlier Soviet proposals, or even if, as Mobbs interprets the Soviet START proposal, “operations by either country anywhere in the world within weapons range of the other country” were banned. However, it would not be true if the zone in question extended a mere few hundred miles outward from the national territory of each Party, and did not encompass the territories of third parties or non-adjacent international airspace.¹⁶⁴ Whether such a circumscribed zone would appeal to the Soviets is uncertain, but it is at least in keeping with the principle of their earlier proposals, ostensibly designed to reduce international tensions. The adamant American refusal at START even to consider such a scheme, of course, allowed no room for exploring any possible flexibility in the Soviet position on this matter.

Aerial “stand-off” zones of this kind could cover the entire borders of the states concerned or begin experimentally on their Arctic frontiers alone. Since such a high proportion of aerial probing, and interception, does in fact occur in the Arctic regions, it would be a particularly useful measure as far as this area is concerned, and the confidence-building effect even of zones limited to the Arctic could be significant in terms of the overall phenomenon.

¹162. I am indebted to Jane Boulden for this point.

163. Mobbs, *op. cit.* note 129, p. 160.

164. An exception could perhaps be made for Canadian airspace, on grounds of the close integration of Canadian and US air defences.