

ments and bitter disappointment. Worse, defective Confidence-Building Measures could prove to be counterproductive, eventually leading to increased suspicion or even masking deliberately aggressive military plans. It should be quite apparent that, as a consequence of these very real possibilities, we must pay serious attention to the generic weaknesses that characterize a great deal of Confidence-Building thinking.

Analyzing the nature of these generic flaws and suggesting directions for corrective revisions is a difficult task, one that we can only begin in this study. As an illustration of the level and type of difficulty involved in this analysis, consider the initial "discovery" of the nine generic flaws listed earlier. These nine could hardly be regarded as glaringly self-evident. It is very unlikely, for instance, that anyone's casual inspection of the largely unstructured and diverse Confidence-Building literature would produce such a list of theoretical and substantive shortcomings. In order to "discover" this extensive collection of generic flaws, it was necessary to examine the CBM literature with the aid of a suitable analytic perspective, looking beyond the more obvious superficial shortcomings for the more substantial but subtle errors of commission and omission that shape the basic reasoning of that literature. The particular analytic perspective used to identify these generic flaws, incidentally, employed a complex, multi-causal view of the security policy process and a conception of human decision making that embraces the subtle, disruptive power of everyday cognitive processes. This suited it well to highlighting the deeper faults of existing Confidence-Building thinking.

The conclusion flowing from the detailed analysis of the Confidence-Building literature (and, to a lesser extent, Confidence-Building thinking) is that a number of basic conceptual problems distort our understanding of what Confidence-Building is and can be. These problems produce an image of Confidence-Building that is: without a model of the Confidence-Building process; excessively simplified; and reliant on very unsophisticated (implicit) models of East-West military interaction. Their serious negative influence demonstrates how necessary it is to consciously develop an explicit understanding of how Confidence-Building (in its various forms) actually works, an under-

standing that draws upon contemporary psychology and political science rather than intuition and casual speculation.

Discovering the specific weaknesses of existing Confidence-Building ideas is barely half the analytic battle, however. At least as important is the problem of "correcting" the influence of these generic flaws on Confidence-Building thinking. This is an exceptionally difficult job because the "revised" assumptions, ideas and perspectives that constitute the "corrections" are, in most cases, far from being fully developed and generally lack the attractive but misleading simplicity of existing assumptions and perspectives. These new ideas about (1) how people deal with complex and inherently uncertain policy problems; (2) how various types of misperception consistently distort our understanding of complex issues; and (3) how to analyze the nature of the WTO-NATO military and foreign policy relationship have yet to be integrated into the analysis of Confidence-Building Measures. In fact, many of these ideas are only now being explored by policy analysts for the first time. As was noted earlier, even demonstrating the existence of the pervasive but almost always implicit assumptions that pre-structure so much of our current thinking about Confidence-Building is far from being a straightforward undertaking. The extensive and detailed original analysis that these complex "corrections" require is simply beyond the scope and means of this preliminary study. Nevertheless, we can explore the basic outline of these issues in order to get some idea of how Confidence-Building thinking can be revised and improved.

Perhaps the best method of dealing with this very involved set of analytic complaints is to look, first of all, for a simpler, more basic way of characterizing the problems with the Confidence-Building literature and with Confidence-Building-thinking more generally. Careful examination suggests that the existing list of nine generic flaws can be reduced to two fundamental types of generic error. The first is context-oriented and the second is process-oriented. They are:

1. Inadequate assessments of Soviet conventional military forces and the nature of the threat that they actually pose;

