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at any time it were possible to form a just appreciation of the motives which impel the Pathan to the test. mind, the administration of the Northwest Frontier would be a simple affair. But it is not pos-

sible, writes the Peshawar corre-

spondent of the London Times. Even in the simplest administrative problems our frontier officers are baffled by the trail of inconsistency which intermingles with the truth. It is impossible, therefore, to be dogmatic on questions of frontier policy. Before accepting any claim to diagnose the causes responsible for the recent disturbance of the frntier, the student should clearly understand that in the present case the history of the upheaval is more than usually chequered with its dark patches of inscrutable and inconsistent motive. But even with this knowledge there must be no misapprehension as to the serious nature of the circumstances directly responsible for the rising. It is no alarmist statement to pronounce that during the past two months the Government of India have been confronted with a foreign situation more serious and delicate than any that has happened since the Penjdeh affair in 1885.

On broad lines, the origin of the 1008 risings can be traced to three causes. These are the Japanese successes against Russia in 1904, the existing unrest in British India, and the Ameer's recent visit to India. Each of these circumstances in its beafing upon the Northwest Frontier deserves some separate discussion. To take the Russo-Japanese war first: no one with any real knowledge of India and the East will disguise from himself the effect of the Japanese triumph in our Eastern Empire. The total defeat of an Occidental Power by a purely Oriental nation has, not unnaturally, suggested to the Eastern mind the advent of general Occidental decadence. In Afghanistan, the overthrow, of Russia by Japan has been interpreted as an unqualified demonstration of British degeneracy. British diplomacy, as far as it was understood in Kabul, had coquetted with Alfghanistan as if it viewed Russia with apprehension. To the Oriental mind to show apprehension is to admit inferiority. To avoid laboring this point, it is sufficient to say that in Afghanistan and India alike the successes of our allies in the Far East brought us little advantage.

The second issue need not be discussed at length: In many ways it is covered by the foregoing argument. It can hardly be said that the unrest in India is a result of the Japanese war, but it may fairly be claimed that the demonstration of Oriental superiority over Occidental in the arts and practices of war quickened its development. To the plotters in Afghanistan, watching the course of current history with ambitious scrutiny, the sudden development of the seditious movement in India brought endorsement of their own de- he is afraid to quarrel with the influence of

ductions. The Occidental was decadent. In so much as this fact was assured, it would be worth while, they argued, to put the theory Now we come to the third and most signi-

ficant of the traceable causes. The visit of the Ameer of Afghanistan to India in 1906 furnished an opportunity by which it was possible to convert ambition-fed theory into concrete action. The story is a long sequence of intricate plotting and machination. Such affairs, of necessity, move slowly. Thus it is that we find events that found their birth in 1904 only showing developments in 1908. In the winter of 1906-7 Habibullah Khan, Ameer of Afghanistan, for the first time left his own territories and visited Hindustan as the guest of the Government of India. The ordering of the affairs of Afghanistan in his absence he left in the hands of his brother, Nasrullah Khan. And since the date that the Ameer crossed his frontier at Landi Kotal Nasrullah Khan has been the chief instrument influencing our relations with Afghanistan. It is a page of characteristic, if infamous intrigue. How far it has proceeded with the knowledge and consent of the Ameer, how much in defiance of his wishes and intentions, at the present moment no one in India can say. All these details are veiled in that obscurity which surrounds all trans-frontier diplomacy. But this much is clearly demonstrated-Nasrullah Khan, who, after his visit to England, became somewhat pro-European, subsequently discovered that he had a predilection for religious research. In a word, his intriguing instinct prompted him to undertake the cult of the mullah. The cleverness of the move became apparent as soon as the Ameer was brought into contact with the tainted influences of the infidel. Even before his return to Afghanistan Habibullah came under the lash of the Mullah's strictures. The sect into whose hands Nasrullah has played anathematize him for his familiarity with the Kaffir. They accuse him of apostasy, and protest the godliness of the example set by his younger brother. Now, to the untutored all this may read as trivial and childish. But it must be remembered that today in Afghanistan the influence of the pulpit upon public opinion is as all powerful as it was in this country four to five hundred

years ago. Moreover there is no dividing line between spiritual and secular affairs. To the Afghan all is of the faith and for the faith, while the mullahs are the sole propagandists of the faith. It is probably no exaggeration to say that when the Ameer returned from his visit to India he found that his brother's stewardship had stripped him of 50 per cent. of his own influence. But the point which is not clear is whether Habibullah is a consenting party to this transfer. It may be that in his habit of life he is content to be relieved of much of the cares of State. Or it may be that

the mullahs. The fact remains, however, that. he has made no effort to check his brother's ascendency. It is possible that he has reached the limit in mental stability which in the past has ruined so many Oriental careers, that sudden numbness of faculty which finds the hitherto strong and alert content to sink their individuality in another, provided their lusts and pleasures suffer no disturbance.

Be this as it may, Nasrullah and his coterie of mullahs seem to have come to the conclusion that the time was ripe to test their esti-, mate of British power in India. They knew well enough how to apply the torch. There exists, unhappily enough, throughout the length and breadth of our unadministered territory coterminous to Afghanistan, sufficient fanatical material for the mullahs' purposes. A very little support from Afghanistan, and the unrest on the border betrayed itself in a series of trans-frontier raids. It can hardly be 'written off" merely as a coincidence that, while this period of raiding was in force, the Government of India were unable to elicit any reply from Kabul concerning their pressing questions with regard to the Anglo-Russian Agreement.

Then as a result of this persistent raiding came the expedition against the Zakka Khel. On military grounds, as a punitive expedition, Sir James Willcocks' operations leave nothing to be desired, and the fact that the operations were brought to a close apparently without sacrificing the good will of the whole Afridi nation is a matter for considerable congratulation. But at the time the broader issues were concealed. For instance, no one in England realized when they were congratulating the Government of India on their achievement in rapid punitive measures that there. had aiready grown out of them a casus belli with Afghanistan, that an Afghan lashkar had crossed the Durand line and was hastening to join issue with our enemies in Bazar valley. That was the Government of India's secret, and it is perhaps, a matter for further, congratulation that for the time being it was well

But through all this it is easy to trace the hand of Nasrullah. Armed Afghans do not cross the border in their hundreds without the knowledge and consent of the ruling power behind. The directness and swift character of ali retribution is sufficient guarantee for thisstatement. The movement to Bazar gave the Mullahs their cue. In the devout persons of cross was carried to those territories for the good behavior of which we are responsible, and which, ironically enough, we do not administer. It was pointed out in categorical detail to these inflammable tribesmen that the Kaffirs were afraid of the True Benevers in the hills, and had, therefore, determined to destroy or annex them. The railway to Jamrud, the proposed line to Warsak were quoted as tangible proof of this. It was then shown by inverted

argument that all this was a sign of weakness; that on the signal from Kabul the Infidel Army were prepared to join issue with True Beally, that the whole of the Ameer's trained lashkars would support them in the field.

Now the Yaghistan Pathan will listen to much of this without movement unless some circumstance occurs to prime the torch. In Tirah, for instance, the transborder emissaries met with no success. The Afridi had accepted the word of the Government Agent, and had seen his word fulfilled before the Afghan pressure became acute. Besides, owing to the popularity of service in the Indian Army, the Afridi are more in sympathy with our methods than the other tribes. But in the Mohmand hills there occurred just that small incendiary incident which, when the fuel is stacked, lights the conflagration. But before I turn to this it is necessary to study the ultimate motive of the Afghan movement.

It must be allowed that it is not easy to discern any motive that appears rational. But we are faced with the pitfalls embodied in Pathan reasoning, and must be prepared to admit defeat. It is, therefore, only permissible to surmise a motive.

That a country, situated as is Afghanistan, hould deliberately furnish the Government of India with a casus beli would suggest that it entertained extreme contempt for the latter's military ability to resent the insult. As has already been pointed out, Nasrullah and his bellicose mullahs had been preaching this impotency for months. Is it not possible, therefore, that in the exuberance of their fanaticism they had brought themselves to believe their fanciful statements, and were now prepared to put the matter to the test?

From every standpoint it promised to be a fairly safe move. If the Peshawar garrison proved unequal to the onslaught, then it would be time enough to hoist the banner of Islam. over the Bala Hissar, and to proclaim either Habibullah or Nasrullah, as the case might warrant, as the Apostle of the Faith. But if the troops of the Government should prove stanch, why the wretched unadministered tribesmen they had implicated would bear the cost of the failure. Nasrullah knew his Government of India, and realised that the small affair of the violation of the border by an Afghan lashkar or two could come up for amicable settlement later. . It may be that the motive was deeper, that it was a direct attempt the Hazrat Sahib and Sufi Mullah the fiery by Nasrullah to prejudice his brother both with the Government of India and his own mullah-swayed people. But here we are again lost in the field of conjecture. What we do know is that Nasrullah permitted the Afghans to join the Mohmands, and that it was Habibullah's order that brought them back. This in itself may be reckoned a diplomatic victory for Nasrullah.

And now we come to the little incident which lighted the fire of fanaticism on the valor.

Mohmand Hills from Akra Dag to Kabul Tsappar. Certain names stand out upon the Peshawar border for good and evil. From the lievers against their Infidel masters; and fin- standpoint of the Indian frontier officer, the evil names on the Mohmand border are those of Mahasul, Khoda Khel Baizai, and Mir Baz,

Ambahar Utman Khel. Both these men have been prime mover in all raids into British territory from across the Michni-Abazai line. These men began as expert rifle thieves, and their raids have increased in audacity in ratio with their successes. Their route to and from their mountain fastnesses has usually been down the Pandiali Valley, the same a recently employed by the 1st bridgade of the Mohmand Field Force in its return to India. Earlier in the year the raiders embarked upon a raiding enterprise and carried back with the spoils a Hindu bunnia. While passing through the Pandiali country the bunnia and his escort came to the homestead of one Ghulam Khan. Now for some occult reason this Ghulam Khan took it upon himself to render to the Government an unsolicited service. What possessed him suddenly to develop this attitude it is impossible to surmise. But he captured the bunnia and his escort and forwarded both to the authorities in Peshawar.

The whole Yaghistan borders shook with anathema against Ghulam Khan. A thousand raiders laden with plunder as they took the Alikandi route homewards must have passed his door. He had never raised a finger before, and now! The Hazrat Sahib, Jan Sahib, and Gud Mullah wanted no further impetus to their jehad. Anyway, a lashkar of the faithful should destroy Ghulam Khan, myrmidon of the Kaffirs, root and branch!

Ghulam Khan pointed out his impending fate to the Peshawar authorities and prayed for help. His quixotic act of loyalty had placed the Government of India in a dilemma. Morally, they were bound to befriend this man, who, acting on their behalf, had brought a hornet's nest about his ears; but diplomatically, at this crucial moment, it was impolitic to enter unadministered territory. Luckily Ghulam Khan solved the difficulty himself, for he fled to British territory and reported that a Mohmand lashkar had razed his homestead.

Of this lashkar the Government of India was destined to hear more. The looting of Ghulam Khan's tower and hamlet had whetted the lust for war and rapine. The Hazrat Sahib dangled the promises of the Faith before them. The sweets of Paradise and a dbzen houris. aplece awaited them an Shabkadr. Willingly the men painted their cyclashes, and shouldered their rifles; light-footed, they stepped down the boulder-strewn Alikandi route to the sub-montane flats between Shabkadr and Abazai. Here they were on their historic battlefield. Three times before on this, very ground had they or their fathers measured themselves with the Infidels. Improvident children of the mountains, they recked nothing of the consequences of their ignorant

AN OUTDOO How to Decorat HE gan room consi dig. made which our a far spend day's work in an off house, or the cramp The most import this outdoor living on. Have some go benches on which yo ous work of spading During these bro over your garden better, which will m of fighting the weed The commonly "rustic" chair or b vou do not care to g them, they can be m which have been cu has stopped running to the wood; if cut easily. Paint all th paint and countersi this rustic furniture of cypress and pain seats may be had straight or circula have, it must be co

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TEN WAY

Although the c perennial, roses m many other ways in beds and rows. arbors, pergolas, p to cover fences grown as specime hardly enumerate be used, for each peculiar problems. Roses will grow soil provided they ation; they will n With a fairly lan handling, one can June until Decemi In many of t sees arches made Inter, covered wit I'ke these can be good advantage in to the gardens. pipe bent into th croquet wicket, o stantial structure. old garden was thr and the effect pro it was never forgo made of wood, w two to four feet d One often see They are two to th seats in them. T red with lattice-w enough cross-pier These little arche much to the gen vided, of course, eral architectural In the averag posts which serv a day or two eac no doubt, but far ago I saw a back lem had been solv hooks about eig represent ornam in the post near the post. The h projected beyond look bad, becaus The best rose are the Crimson