

will. It is that which forms the character, expresses the person, and shapes the immortal destiny of man. As is the will, so is the character ; as is the character, so is the person ; and as is the person, so is the immortal destiny of the man.

The other faculties, therefore, find their proper end only as they are subservient to the will. "No form of cognition," says Dr. Hickok, "is ultimate, and knowing is itself in the interest of a further end. What we come to know affects us agreeably or disagreeably, and our intelligent capability takes nothing which does not quicken under it some pleased or displeased feeling." The intellect, "separate from this susceptibility, would be but a sluggish, moribund faculty, fruitless and worthless in its own solitude." The same may be said of emotion. It also is in the interest of a farther end. Aroused by the intellect, it becomes a motive spring, prompting the will to action. It may, indeed, be exercised in the form of pure sentiment ; but where the sentiment is not translated into action, it becomes sickly and detrimental to the life, and introduces chaos and disorganization into the being.

Let us clearly notice this point, for it contains the principle, in accordance with which we must determine the value of much of the emotional in our religious exercises. *Emotion should be a motive spring to action, and where it is aroused for other purposes it reacts to the detriment of our being.* An illustration of this fact may be found in the constant reader of fiction. He reads, let us say, stories in which human misery is constantly portrayed. His sympathies are aroused, and he weeps over the distresses of his imaginary heroes ; but there is nothing to call forth any *active* sympathy on his part. He cannot perform any deeds of charity toward the imaginary sufferer. The result is that while he becomes accustomed to the idea of suffering in his fellow-men, he does not form the habit of benevolence ; and hence soon he will be able to see real suffering, and neither feel pity for the sufferer nor any prompting to relieve his misery. His novel aroused his emotions, but there was no opportunity for translating them into action ; hence he lost the capability of feeling pity when the real case of suffering presented itself ; and his last state was worse than the first. The emotions, by not subserving any end beyond themselves, became callous, and hence failed to respond when the real occasion for their exercise presented itself.

From the principles thus far laid down we may see the place of emotion in religion, and may perhaps point out how it is often abused and how it may be awakened to advantage.

1. We remark, in the first place, that emotion must be formed anew by the power of the Christian life. Emotion does not give birth to the Christian life ; but the Christian life must lay hold of the emotions and so purify the springs of action in them that they may prompt to a holy and pure life. The appetencies, which are the deepest element in emotion, were no doubt in the first place pure and good, and impelled man only