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If a person manifests it he should be a differential may steal from me the moment that the old swathe themselves duce. Whatever con-oughtness" or "ought-character or relation; thus aroused, always ly, by putting the ex-ellings of conscience, nation and pacification

ness to the subjective a. We do not always "oughtness," etc., in of a right or wrong of the conscience in ing sentiment of our subjective feelings as a verity, or as to on of these feelings. for his money, will not the act.

subjective feelings of tion or pacification; ence, in connection etc.

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provision made for lation. In reply to his whole nature is on whom he is lus, is to destroy or stem that acknow- reward or punish- mon with that of is also noteworthy of duty, are of a re possible, giving unishment subjec- the subjective feel- erence clear of all es, that introduce

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in my mind a subjective condemnatory feeling or a sense of "ought-not-ness," that he should have done so. The man stands before me, in the conception so created respecting him, swathed with the condemnatory subjective sentiment which he with his act has aroused; and I call his act unjust. If we compare his act with one of a still more flagrant character, the latter excites in us a still stronger condemnatory feeling, and we say the latter is more unjust still. If anyone asks us why this condemnatory feeling is excited within us at such a presentation, we can only answer that we cannot tell. It is just a law of our nature to regard thus appreciatively everything that transpires around us, and we cannot help it. We thus call every thing or act unjust that excites this condemnatory subjective feeling within us.

By comparing a number of cases (that is, a number of objects of exciting character or relation) which excite this condemnatory subjective feeling within us, and, analyzing them, we are able to form a clear intellectual conception of the elements of injustice, as they exist in the external objects; and having thus formed a distinct idea of injustice in the mind, we are able to tell at once what is just or unjust, without even a single appeal to the subjective feeling itself.

In precisely the same way that we form the idea of injustice we form the conception of a just act, from the acquittive subjective sense which it arouses within our minds on cognition; so also of good or evil in outward things, from the approbative or disapprobative subjective sense, aroused within us, by the perception or inception of such things. This principle applies, in like manner, with reference to all the other subjective feelings of conscience.

The subjective feeling is thus the primary source of our conception of injustice, or of any other of these ideas, arising within the sphere of conscience, the "Heart," etc.; and it is thus in the mind of man the first and only guide to the formation of an intellectual standard as to the moral qualities of outward things or acts.

Every man thus carries in his mind two rules or standards, which he may apply at any time: (1) the subjective feeling itself; and (2) the merely intellectual one, that applies to the outward thing, or act, as possessing such character or relation as is known from past experience to excite the subjective feeling. "Rightness" and "wrongness," as subjective feelings or senses, are no part of the outside physical elements constituting an act. Rightness or wrongness, as intellectually seen in the outward act, is just the peculiar relation which it sustains to a moral agent. This peculiar relation, intellectually seen, arouses the appreciative subjective sense, acquittive or condemnatory, that apprehends its moral quality; for we perceive no moral quality in the act till the sense is aroused.

It is evident, then, that there must be a certain excellence, or the contrary, in these outward moral relations, when they arouse these appreciative subjective senses in perception.

We trust that we have said in the foregoing remarks will sufficiently show the manner in which all subjective feelings of conscience are excited, and, also, how cold intellectual conceptions of the moral character, or moral relation of the outside objects are formed, apart from the subjective feelings which are their primary source,

Subjective Feelings of Conscience in Activity.

As shown elsewhere, this class of feelings, like all others, admit of pacification directly or by reposition. We call their method of appeasement pacification, instead of gratification, for the reason, that in general their mode of appeasement really partakes more of the nature of pacification than of gratification.

As these subjective senses concern themselves with duty, and are more of the nature of authoritative command than of desire or aversion, whenever an exciting object is put into the relation or character to which their impulse prompts, their method of appeasement in general is correctly described as pacificatory.

As an example of direct pacification, we come to know of an act of disinterested kindness being done by one man to another. A subjective sense of approbateness is aroused within us by the knowledge of it. This man's act being in itself good, of course gratifies or pacifies the impulse of the approbative sentiment which it has kindled; and the impulse tends to no other mode of pacification. This, then, would be a case of direct pacification. If, however, this act of his cost him considerable self-sacrifice, it possibly may arouse within us subjectively a sense of "ought-ness" that he should be rewarded. This would be a clear case of reposition.

Both modes of pacification among this class of feelings are common enough; but, as already mentioned elsewhere, all of this class of feelings that are aroused by the violation of duty, seek pacification by putting the exciting object into the relations or character of compensative duty. For instance, the knowledge that a man (with whom I am dealing) is my neighbour, ought to excite in me the subjective feeling that I ought not to injure him. The impulse within me here is non-injury to my neighbour; and if the relation which it suggests