

He urged that the drive should begin by offering to send over an Atomic Energy of Canada team to tell British authorities the latest CANDU success story. This should be followed up by an invitation for a team of senior British authorities to visit Canada and see the CANDU system in action for themselves.

Warren also took the precaution of warning that success was far from certain. But, without a new effort to get CANDU's merits across to the British, failure was already certain.

During a visit to London in May 1973, Alastair Gillespie, the Canadian Minister of Industry, Trade and Commerce, had met with the British Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, Peter Walker. The day after Warren's cable, Ottawa responded by cabling the text of a letter from Gillespie to Walker. The Minister reminded Walker that, during their May talks, they had discussed the scope for Britain and Canada to work together in the nuclear-power field. He reminded Walker of his invitation that a British team be sent to Canada to meet with Atomic Energy and Ontario Hydro officials and see the Pickering reactor station in action. Gillespie said he thought it would be timely to renew the invitation. He also proposed to send over an Atomic Energy team and suggested Canadian and British officials explore areas for co-operation by agencies and firms in both countries in developing nuclear-power facilities during the next few years. Gillespie followed up the letter with a transatlantic telephone call two days later.

The new CANDU sales drive was on. But it still had not broken into the realm of public diplomacy. Warren's first purpose had been to ensure, through private diplomacy, that nothing would be done to offend British officialdom. Meanwhile, a strategy had also been worked out at meetings in the main headquarters of the High Commission, Macdonald House in Grosvenor Square. There was general agreement that the first priority should be to persuade the British not to discard the CANDU-style pressure-tube reactor for the American-designed pressure-vessel reactor. It was also agreed that the campaign must be strictly positive — no knocking anybody else's reactor technology. The emphasis must be on the positive aspects of CANDU-type reactors, including the version Britain had itself been developing.

Chances of success

From the vantage-ground of the press office, the chances of success looked better in the political than in the technological

*Failure certain
without new effort
to communicate
CANDU'S merits*

*Strategy
worked out
at headquarters
in London*

...red to offer a direct CANDU sale to
...tain, provided it would be given as
...ous consideration as America's. A cas-
... interest would only cost Canada money
... waste a lot of valuable time. Atomic
... energy would be prepared to offer the
... entral Generating Board a CANDU sys-
... at a firm price, with significant British
... tent in its production, and with full
... rformance warranties and completion-
... te guarantees. It would also be willing to
... fer a complete nuclear-power plant from
... anada, though Gray was sure this would
... unacceptable to British authorities and
... dustry.

No decision had yet been taken to
... ve the CANDU campaign into the
... alm of public diplomacy, as we in the
... ess office were recommending. But in the
... ublic" field of diplomacy, events be-
... to move rapidly. Warren and others at
... e High Commission did some fast sound-
... gs in the more usual — to use a well-
... rn phrase — "diplomatic channels". It
... as found that new initiatives to win sup-
... rt for CANDU-type technology with
... ritish authorities would raise no official
... ckles. In fact, there were indications
... at some British officials who opposed the
... merican reactor design would welcome a
... der public debate in Britain about this
... tal decision.

On November 6, Warren reported the
... ults of the soundings to Ottawa in an-
... her diplomatic cable. By happy coinci-
... nce, Jeanne Sauvé, Canada's Minister
... Science and Technology, had scheduled
... official visit to London about the begin-
... ng of November. Warren was able to
... clude in his cable her finding that there
... as evidence of support for the Canadian
... actor system and its potentialities across
... broad spectrum of British persons with
... stake of one kind or another in Britain's
... entual decision. It had also been deter-
... ined what the main factors in the de-
... sion were likely to be.

British needs

... ving had many problems and failures
... ith its own nuclear-power technology,
... ritain now wanted a reactor system with
... record of reliable performance, economic
... eration, proved safety record, design
... xibility, commercial application and ex-
... rt potential. These were all CANDU
... alities. But the soundings had also
... rmed up evidence that the British were
... r from fully aware of these qualities.
... arren advised Ottawa that, unless the
... erits of the CANDU system were quickly
... ought to British attention in a new
... ling drive, Canadian-style reactor tech-
... ology would find itself on the sidelines.