

(b) *Deficiencies in Leadership and Representation*

*Board Chairman.* The designation of Winkler (Czechoslovakia) to be the first Chairman of the Board represented a quid pro quo to the U.S.S.R. in return for acceptance of Cole (U.S.A.) as Director General. Winkler, though a highly capable Chairman, did not hesitate to use his powers (albeit subtly) to advance Eastern European objectives. Bernardez of Brazil who followed is a pleasant, tactful and well-meaning individual but an ineffective Chairman, allowing discussion to become disorderly and confused leading to inconclusive and often ambiguous decisions.

*Representatives.* As indicated above, the United States member of the Board is not a dynamic individual. The United Kingdom representative, though very competent, has not always been in a position to provide leadership because of the desire of his Government to limit expenditures. The French representative, for special reasons noted below, is unpredictable and often difficult. Most of the under-developed countries seem to be represented on the Board by local diplomatic representatives who either seemed uninstructed or incapable of understanding the issues under consideration. This leaves a relatively small number of delegations including Canada, South Africa, Japan and the Netherlands in the difficult position of attempting to give direction to the discussions.

(c) *U.S.S.R. Position*

From the outset, the U.S.S.R. has paid lip service to the purposes of the Agency, yet the record demonstrates clearly that Russian performance has been at variance with declared objectives. This seeming Russian "perfidy" has been noted by many observers and various views have been advanced as to basic Russian motivation. In my opinion, the U.S.S.R. position in this Agency is consistent with normal Communist attitudes and tactics.

I would presume that the U.S.S.R. recognized the potential benefits, both tangible and political, that might result if the original U.S.A. initiative leading to establishment of the Agency should be successful. It can be assumed that the U.S.S.R. wished to be in a position to participate in any benefits that might accrue to members of the Agency while at the same time to capitalize on any internal dissension that might arise or perhaps even to be in a position to exert influence to prevent the experiment from being too successful. The following illustrations would seem to confirm this assumption: (a) ostensible U.S.S.R. support for a dynamic programme at the same time as their representative on the Board was offering the most vigorous resistance to the provision of adequate resources to carry out such a programme; (b) the professed support for the principle of safeguards while raising strong objections to the rights of inspection essential to an effective system of safeguards; and (c) the most vigorous oral support for the claims of under-developed countries for assistance from the Agency while the Russian contributions have been relatively low and subject to limitations on expenditures outside the U.S.S.R.

Unfortunately for the Western group, these Russian positions have often been advanced in subtle terms thereby concealing their true motivation from the less sophisticated members (particularly from the under-developed countries). For instance, objection to provision of resources for programme is never advanced directly but rather is cloaked as an effort to improve efficiency or secure economies in administration. Similarly, opposition to safeguards is never expressed directly but in terms of resistance to an infringement of national sovereignty. Refusal to approve expenditure for a laboratory necessary for implementation of safeguards and to discharge the authorized functions of the Agency is attributed to a desire to protect the under-developed countries against heavy and unnecessary costs of membership.