

Why Togo was chosen is probably to be explained by the following facts:

- A—he is perhaps the ablest and certainly one of the most experienced of Japanese diplomats, with a special knowledge of Germany and Russia;
- B—he is unquestionably patriotic;
- C—he is known and respected by the British and Americans, so that however external events develop—whether war or rapprochement is the ultimate policy—Togo's abilities and character will be a source of strength to Japan.

Whether Togo as Foreign Minister will be able to do anything to modify recent trends in Japanese foreign policy is open to question; but it can be assumed with complete confidence that he will do nothing to make that policy more dangerous or more vicious than it now is.

1373.

1698-A-40

*Mémorandum du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
au Comité de guerre du Cabinet*

*Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs
to Cabinet War Committee*

SECRET

[Ottawa,] October 21, 1941

REPORT OF SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON MEASURES TO BE TAKEN
IN THE EVENT OF WAR WITH JAPAN

1. War Committee gave general approval to the Report on October 9, subject to concurrence by the three Defence Services which has since been given.

2. In addition to this general approval, it is desirable that War Committee should expressly decide now whether the "War Telegram" (notifying Canada of the commencement of War between the United Kingdom and Japan) may be taken as a signal to do some of the things recommended in the Report. The alternative would be for the execution of some or all of those recommendations to be delayed until Canada formally enters the war.

3. It is necessary to obtain a decision as to whether the following action can be taken on receipt of the War Telegram and pending declaration of war or other formal action by the government:

- (a) Should the Canadian armed forces, and in particular the Canadian Navy, engage the Japanese?
- (b) Should communications with Japan be terminated?