

guides," who shall be paid by the United States for their services, the article closes thus: "Provided always, That the necessary ferrics over the water courses, crossed by the said road, shall *be held and deemed to be the property of the Chickasaw nation.*"

The second article makes a pecuniary compensation to the Chickasaws for "their respectful and friendly attention to the President of the United States of America, and *to the request made to them, in his name, to permit the opening of the road.*"

Who is the superior here? Translate these passages faithfully, and send them to the Emperor of China, and let him lay the matter before his counsellors, who never heard of the United States. They will say, in a moment, that the Mingo of the Chickasaws is a monarch, who, in his great condescension, has granted the humble request of the President, on the condition that the petitioner shall make a pecuniary compensation, and pay tribute, under the name of ferrage, to the Chickasaws, as often as any of the President's peoplo pass through the territory of the king of the Chickasaws.

According to the recent code of national morality, what is to be the operation of this Chickasaw treaty? Most undoubtedly, in the first place, the Chickasaws *may close up the road*, the stipulations of the treaty to the contrary notwithstanding. Indeed, they must have exercised great forbearance already, as they have permitted the road to be open *twenty seven years*, solely out of regard to this treaty; just as Georgia has waited twenty-seven years before taking possession of the Cherokee territory, out of complaisance to the engagements of the United States, which it would seem, are to be discarded as of no validity.

In the second place, none of the treaties made subsequently by the Chickasaws are binding upon them; and therefore they may reclaim all the lands which they have ceded to the United States. Of course, the inhabitants of West Tennessee, who now live on fertile lands, which were ceded to the whites by the Chickasaws, must immediately remove, if the Chickasaws require it. The reason is plain. No superior can be bound to an inferior; but that the Chickasaws *are* the superiors, is evident, as the Secretary of War says in the other case, because "the emphatic language" of the treaty "cannot be mistaken."

But it may be said, that there are other indications in the treaty of Hopewell, that the United States assumed a superiority, beside the phraseology, in the instances above cited. The question is not, be it remembered, whether the United States, at the time of the treaty of Hopewell, were a more powerful nation than the Cherokees; but whether, being a more powerful nation, they are on that account exempted from the obligation of treaties.

The Cherokees did, undoubtedly, place themselves under the protection of the United States, in the third article. They had formerly been under the protection of the king of Great Britain; but his power had failed them. It was natural that they should accept proffers of protection from some other quarter. This is not a new thing in the world. From the time of Abraham to the present day, there have been alliances, offensive and defensive, confederacies, and smaller states relying for protection upon the plighted faith of larger ones. But what is implied in the very idea of protection? Is it not that the party protected is to have