

that, I believe we have to do one of two things, when it comes to the matter of supreme strategy: either we must have confidence in those who are at the head of the united nations' war effort of to-day, do all we can to let the world see that we have that confidence, and assist them in every way we can, or we must take a different attitude, one which to my mind could only result in disaster.

But when I say that countries other than Great Britain and the United States were not represented at the Casablanca conference, it does not mean that the governments of those countries were not fully aware of the discussions that were going to take place there, and that they have not been informed with respect to discussions that have taken place. In connection with all matters pertaining to the war there is a certain procedure that has been built up—improvised, if you like. It has had to be improvised, because the war is something new, and the situation changes from day to day. And in that improvisation of the war effort of so many nations, tacitly if you like—and I think more than tacitly; I could say openly—there has been a recognition of the fact that the Prime Minister of Great Britain and the President of the United States were the two men around whom all could rally in support of any policies concerning which they might give the final word. In the shaping of that policy every part of the British empire and all of the united nations, in so far as it is possible for them to be consulted and informed in the matter, have a part.

Our chiefs of staff in this city are in constant touch with the combined chiefs of staff having their headquarters at Washington. The war committee of the cabinet is informed of the discussions taking place there from day to day. We have a permanent liaison officer, an official of the government, who is there at the present time, and is there also throughout the year. We are entitled to follow discussions and to be heard respecting any aspect of the war situation we may wish to present. Canada's interests in these matters are placed fully before the boards that are continuously sitting and dealing with these matters.

A decision reached at Casablanca is not a decision come to suddenly by the President and the Prime Minister. Such decision is the outcome of discussions which have extended over many months, and which are finally crystallized in a formal way by the heads of these two great countries. So far as Canada is concerned, there is no man in any part of the world who has had more intimate and close association with the British staff than

has General McNaughton, the head of the Canadian forces. On military matters, General McNaughton, I venture to say, knows the mind of the staff in Great Britain as well as any member of the staff knows his own mind. And they know General McNaughton's mind. And when British staff officers go to Casablanca they do not go to support a policy which they believe is superior to the views of General McNaughton; they go to support a policy which they know has been fully considered before the matter ever came up in conference there.

I do not think I need go into detail in connection with that matter. However, expecting that the question would be raised this afternoon, I thought it best not to trust myself to express myself extemporaneously on the point, and prepared some notes which I intend to place on *Hansard*.

At six o'clock the house took recess.

### After Recess

The house resumed at eight o'clock.

Mr. MACKENZIE KING: Mr. Speaker, when the house adjourned at six o'clock I was speaking of the conference at Casablanca, and had just stated that having regard to the care with which any statement on a matter so all-important as that of the conference at Casablanca should be prepared, I preferred to read from notes which I had prepared rather than to trust to the expression at the moment of what I might say. Naturally this house will realize that anything that is said in any part of the British commonwealth, if it comes from the lips of the leader of a government in any of those parts, will be taken in all other parts of the world, including enemy countries, as something which is expressive of the policy of the united nations as a whole. I make that statement because there are many questions I should like to answer, many questions that I am in position to answer but am not free to answer. I am not free to answer for the simple reason that they affect all the governments to which I have referred. Without the opportunity of conferring with them and obtaining their consent I would be venturing beyond what I think would be proper to attempt to answer in their name as well as in my own. For the present, therefore, with respect to Casablanca I shall content myself with the following statement.

The talks in Casablanca were discussions between the heads of the United Kingdom and