

Today, our acceptance of this collective principle - or, at any rate, its application in practice - must be qualified, as are so many things, by what the members of the United Nations are willing and able to do. To say we must exercise judgment in deciding how the collective security obligations of the Charter can best be discharged does not mean that we can ever afford to turn a blind eye to any act of aggression. But it does mean that those who have accepted responsibility for national and collective defence must exercise the highest qualities of wisdom, as well as of conscience, in deciding where and how the limited forces at their disposal should be applied.

While we must recognize, then, that collective action to meet aggression may have to vary according to circumstances, the response to aggression in Korea, and the adoption of the "Uniting for Peace" Resolution of November, 1950, are evidence that the great majority of the members of the United Nations desire to work towards the achievement of the kind of collective security envisaged in the Charter.

The answer to the question of whether or not we shall succeed is being given now on the distant Korean battle front by the forces of the United Nations whose sole objective has always been and remains "to repel aggression and to restore peace and security." If that collective action had not been taken in June of 1950, if it had not been firmly pursued within the framework of United Nations decisions, and if it were to be dishonourably abandoned now, there would be little point in our discussing tonight the value of the United Nations. Its value would have depreciated swiftly and perhaps beyond repair.

To sum up, I believe that both fields to which I have referred - technical assistance and collective security - are linked directly to each other. Programmes and measures in both fields must be developed, and, again, priorities must be set in accordance with our best judgment. Within our own national governments we know that such decisions can lead to disagreement over national policies. The same is true internationally. So differences have become apparent, between the materially developed and the underdeveloped countries of the world, over the amount of help which can be extended and the rate at which it can be extended. The countries from whom this material help must principally come believe that they must give first priority to defence measures for their own survival. That security must come first is not, in fact, seriously questioned by anyone. For instance, some countries where the material standard of living is deplorably low and where the need for development is very great, nevertheless feel that they must spend a very heavy proportion of their own income on defence and that this must be given priority. If that is true, then it can readily be understood that others, living under the same fear of war, feel that their defence must be given the same priority over plans for co-operative assistance. In such plans, of course, both sides should benefit, but the benefit on one side is less direct and immediate than on the other and, therefore, less likely to over-ride in the public mind the claim of immediate national defence.