on Syria's acquiescence and assessment that the new systems and procedures would not serve as intelligence gathering platforms from which Israel could "see" into nearby Syria and Jordan.[50] All parties, moreover, would have to agree on the appropriate taskings, composition, equipment and deployment of the observer force responsible for operating the early warning mechanisms and carrying out the verification mission.

Case 4
BORDER/REGION: Central Europe
PARTIES: Members of NATO and Warsaw Pact
POTENTIAL VERIFICATION REGIME:
— National Means
— Multilateral Means
— Multilateral Consultative Mechanism

Of all the settings where the Sinai model might have some relevance, none presents a greater challenge than Central Europe where the superpowers are directly engaged in safeguarding their respective vital interests. Such extensive involvement by the US and the Soviet Union in this region has, of course, important implications for successfully implementing any proposed disengagement scheme. To begin with, it cannot be readily assumed that either the superpowers or their European allies would favour such a scheme. For the superpowers, it seems unlikely that either would, in a confron-

tation, accept that its guard could be lowered substantially as a result of the presence of additional early warning measures and zones of limited forces. For NATO's European members, efforts to establish a verification system and joint restrictions of limited forces zones could accentuate political differences between those countries whose troops and territories would be covered by the reduction and verification areas and those not affected.[51] Similarly, the Soviet Union would be concerned that any proposed constraints neither undermine its control of its East European clients nor prevent Moscow from responding to supposed Western threats and sowing disunity among the NATO allies.

Beyond the political impediments likely to be encountered in implementing a modified version of the Sinai model in Europe, there are a number of technical challenges that must be addressed in designing a workable disengagement and verification system. These are outlined below.

36

---

[50] The technology used in many verification systems is frequently the same technology used for intelligence gathering. Moreover, as verification capabilities are further enhanced, the data collected by such systems may become increasingly useful for non-verification purposes. This problem may be exacerbated in regional settings like the Middle East where states not party to a new agreement may feel threatened by the presence of such systems ostensibly used for verification purposes.

[51] Christoph Bertram, "Mutual Force Reductions in Europe: The Political Aspects", *Adelphi Papers*, No. 84 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1972), p. 14.