

negotiations by demonstrating more flexibility and readiness to compromise. The urgency of achieving results does not only bear upon the chemical weapons convention itself. This segment of our work constitutes an important test case for the over-all commitment of governments to the task of disarmament.

In spite of a negative over-all assessment of the negotiations my delegation, of course, does not wish to belittle the efforts to come to a closer understanding in certain areas of the convention and the progress that has been achieved so far. In the area of elimination of stocks a consensus is now emerging. My delegation is equally hopeful that a solution of the question of verification of initial declarations can be found on the basis of discussing further the ideas of subjecting the declared stocks to verification measures either at intermediate storage sites or at the destruction facility. My delegation also welcomes the endeavour to provide a complete structure for the future chemical weapons convention as has skilfully been elaborated by Ambassador Turbanski of Poland.

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Mr. President, in my statement on 12 July, I began to address the last of four major issues involved in a comprehensive and effective chemical-weapons ban, that is, the vital issue of verification. I described in detail the regime of systematic international on-site verification established by the United States draft convention in document CD/500. I also stated that that regime, by itself, would be inadequate to provide the required assurance of compliance with all the provisions of the draft convention. Today, I will examine the system for dealing with compliance issues that is a necessary and vital complement to the systematic verification regime I described last week.

In the United States view, the future chemical weapons convention should set forth a range of actions that can be taken by a party to resolve compliance concerns. The convention should also set forth the obligations of a party to co-operate in the prompt resolution of such concerns. The arrangements should be designed to prevent dilatory tactics and to promote clarification at the lowest possible political level. However, the right to escalate an issue politically, if necessary, should be built into the arrangements to serve as an important stimulus to provide resolution of compliance problems. A party should be able to select the course of action it believes will resolve its concerns most effectively and expeditiously.

The United States draft convention incorporates a number of provisions for dealing with compliance concerns. These provisions are contained in articles IX, X and XI, as well as in annex II. Taken together, these provisions would provide an effective system for resolving compliance concerns.

Should a party to the convention have reason to believe that another party is not completely fulfilling its commitments under the convention -- if, for example, that party suspects that chemical weapons are being stored at a location that the other party had not declared to be a chemical weapons storage location -- then that party could initiate bilateral consultations with the other party, as provided in article IX. Article IX would require the party receiving such an inquiry to provide sufficient information to the inquiring party to resolve the latter's doubts concerning compliance. If both parties so desired, article IX would permit them to arrange a bilateral inspection to aid in resolving any lingering questions.

When necessary -- if, for example, there continued to be concerns over whether the party was complying with its commitments under the convention -- either party involved in the dispute could request the Executive Council of the Consultative Committee to initiate fact-finding procedures. Upon receiving such a request, the Executive Council