

cussed in this study, Confidence-Building involves a clash between a *rational intention and method* and a *non-rational problem*. Not only is there a fundamental tension and even contradiction between the two central components of Confidence-Building (rational intention and method, non-rational problem), but also there is a serious potential for actually misunderstanding the nature of the non-rational phenomenon *because* it is non-rational. To see why this is so, we must recall the "lesson" about decision-making and rationality. Without reaching any definitive conclusions, we nevertheless saw that "rational decision-making" may be much less "rational" than people suppose because of the effects of various distorting cognitive processes. This much, most decision theorists would accept. If this applies to an enterprise like decision making where the potential for clear-cut, formally rational action is so great, what are the chances that the "rational" intentions (and method) operating as a driving force in Confidence-Building thinking will also be subject to serious distortions? And, given the more-or-less rational intention to deal with misperception (and the belief that the method is appropriate to the problem), what are the chances that its non-rational character will be understood? The "rational intention" is almost certainly associated with a basic way of seeing things – what some call a "rationalistic world-view" – that is likely to distort (ironically, as a consequence of the ever-present operation of cognitive processes) the nature of the "problem". Thus, we may have an under-

standing of Confidence-Building that is twice contaminated by a failure to comprehend the non-rational character of the Confidence-Building problem. Confidence-Building may not be nearly as rational a process as it is apparently assumed to be and the object of the process – avoiding misperception, for short – is a phenomenon whose non-rational character is poorly (if at all) understood. Even if the Confidence-Building process was "more rational", misperception could be, in any event, only poorly dealt with by rational efforts. Misperception and its cognitive kin are thus multiple victims of rational pretensions because they are incorrectly understood when conceptualized within a rational framework and, second, even if correctly understood to be a significantly "non-rational" collection of phenomena, they are not likely to be directly susceptible to ordinary rational efforts at correction. Although it is far from clear, there is a good chance that the naive assumptions about how "Confidence" can be created – the root of the Type Two Generic Flaw – are the result of this failure to understand the various faulty relationships implicitly operating within Confidence-Building thinking.

