peal from the order of a Divisional Court, ante 773, dismissing an appeal from the judgment of TEETZEL, J., upon the findings of a jury, at the second trial of the action. The learned Judge said that he was quite unable to see any principle upon which a prolongation of the litigation could be justified. No question of law was involved. Whatever was said in the judgment granting a new trial (13 O.W.R. 879) was based upon the facts and the findings which then appeared, but the new trial was granted generally. Nothing was to be taken as res adjudicata. And now the only question must be, was there reasonable evidence for the jury on the second trial sufficient to justify the findings then made? The evidence was conflicting, and, at the best, not strong or convincing—particularly as regards the reasonableness of the plaintiff's apprehension of violence if he did not at once alight. But there was certainly evidence which could not have been withdrawn from the jury—and that seemed insuperable on this motion, which must be dismissed with costs. I. F. Hellmuth, K.C., and Angus MacMurchy, K.C., for the defendants. L. F. Heyd, K.C., for the plaintiff.