

struction in the sense that it exists as Nature, and has a meaning, only for an intelligent subject.

But, while every true theory of knowledge must reject the "copying" doctrine, it does not follow that we must accept the humanistic alternative, that the system of nature as it exists for us is the creation of our minds. There is no doubt whatever that the existence of man with his capacity for building up systems of thought makes a difference to reality, a difference which we have to take into account in our philosophies; but surely the question is, whether the constructions of our minds actually bring into being what before the activity of our minds had no reality whatever. We construct an arithmetic, and count the stars in the "great bear." Admit that an "absolute" thinker does not in our sense actually "count" up to 7, and what follows? Surely, it does not follow that our counting has absolutely no meaning as a determination of the constellation? Granting that arithmetic is a construction of ours, it yet is a "construction" that, though it does not "copy" reality, admittedly "conforms" to it. The construction, then, is not perfectly arbitrary; it is not the whole truth about the thing, nor even the most important truth, but it is true, in the sense that it alone is compatible with the facts. And the same principle applies to the other special sciences. Mr. Schiller argues that there are various "geometries," which are just as true, though not as useful, as that of Euclid. But wherein does their truth consist? It consists in the fact that they correctly formulate the results that follow when we fix our attention upon certain aspects of real-

ity and for our special purpose set aside all our aspects. But two or more geometries, all of which equally conform to reality, while contradicting one another, is certainly an absurdity. They are all our "constructions," but what gives them meaning is that they formulate the results which flow from certain actual aspects of reality. For, admittedly, not all constructions, but only those which are confirmed by "experience"—only those that "work"—are able to survive; and I think we may fairly say that they survive because they conform to reality, not that their conformity to reality means nothing but their survival.

I do not think, then, that we can admit the humanistic doctrine that Reality as a whole develops. The supposition that it does seems to me to arise from identifying "Reality" with the immediate sensible world. Defined in this way, Reality must be held to develop when self-conscious beings arise. But surely "Reality" must ultimately include all forms of being, and not merely the simplest forms. Now, while it is true that our "constructions"—i.e., our science, our art, our religion, our philosophy—undoubtedly add to Reality conceived as purely immediate or sensible, I can attach no meaning to the statement that our individual minds, or, if you like, the totality of individual minds, "make" Reality, or even make it out of a pre-existent matter, if this means that they bring into being what had in no sense existence previously in the universe. For, though our intelligence builds up for us the world, it does not build up itself. In all the humanistic attempts to reduce truth to what is "useful," the intelligence