

sport will have the pleasure of seeing His Grace the Archbishop drawn into the controversial ring as the champion of the Illative Sense. The peculiarity of that mysterious faculty is, as Mr. Haultain has acutely shown, that it diminishes with the increasing clearness of the evidence, and disappears altogether when the evidence is quite clear. To make the exposure complete Mr. Haultain, in conclusion, lays hands on the pretended apparition and dragging it under the light, shows that it is nothing but prepossession or prejudice in a new disguise. Had he happened to be specially familiar with the intellectual career and mental habits of the illustrious author of the "Grammar of Assent" he might have seen his way to a still closer identification. He might have detected in the Illative Sense the special faculty which enables a very acute, restless and naturally sceptical mind to believe in the Infallibility of the Pope, Transubstantiation, the Immaculate Conception of the Virgin, the liquefaction of the blood of St. Januarius, the authenticity of the Holy Coat of Treves, and the miraculous migrations of the House of Loretto.

"Is it expedient," asks the author of a pamphlet already cited, "or in accord with the spirit of our representative institutions, that Parliament should abdicate its functions and delegate to the county electorate in detail the determination of a question with which in its representative capacity it dare not deal?" Assuredly it is not; and attention has more than once been called in these columns to the dereliction of duty of which the representatives of the nation are guilty in turning us over to such a substitute for national legislation as the Scott Act. Whatever may be the ultimate effects of the Act, nobody can doubt that its immediate effects must be commercial havoc. In Toronto its adoption would destroy the value of property in the shape of buildings, machinery and established business to the amount of millions; it would throw out of employment, and deprive of their bread a number of workmen, estimated at two thousand, against whom at all events no criminal charge can lie; it would render worthless a mass of securities in the hands of banks, and ruin or seriously injure more than one auxiliary trade. Whether this shall be done is a question which Parliament itself is bound to determine, and to determine at once, that uncertainty, at all events, and the evils connected with it, may be at an end. At present the blow is always hanging over us, and we cannot tell when it may fall. A conclave of private agitators sits watching for a favourable opportunity to spring its mine, which may come to-morrow, or one or two years hence. When the Prohibitionist leaders think they have found it, they will concentrate all the forces and funds of an organized agitation upon the point of attack, while the community at large is unorganized and unprepared to encounter the assault. In the meantime uncertainty and confusion reign. Nor, supposing the assailants to be defeated, will the vote be final, or the commercial community be at rest. Another petition will be got up, and in three years the attempt will be renewed. The threatened interest and all the interests involved in its fate may be almost ruined by protracted menace without bringing the question to a vote. This, at all events, is not a state of things which any Legislature, without an ignominious abdication of its proper functions, can allow to endure. Let Parliament muster courage and do its duty.

It is pleasant to think that Brantford has its philosopher, and a publisher who can bring out a philosophic treatise. Mr. Beattie's Examination of the Utilitarian Theory of Morals gives a clear and comprehensive account, as well as a careful criticism of Utilitarianism in all its phases. The phases of utilitarianism have been many, ranging from a philosophy of mere selfishness, such as that of Hobbes and Mandeville, to one which so far as regards the relation between the object of the individual and that of his friend, or to use the jargon now in fashion between Egotism and Altruism, is hardly distinguishable from Christian Ethics. Utility is a relative term; and so far as man is social everything that is useful to society must be useful to the individual man. What then is the distinctive feature of Utilitarianism? Mr. Beattie, we apprehend, lays his finger on the point when, commencing to state his own view in contradistinction to the Utilitarian Theory, he lays it down that the foundation of Morals is to be found finally in the Divine Nature. Utilitarian morality is that which rests merely upon an inductive view of our interest in this life. It excludes the ideas of Deity, of an authoritative conscience, of obligation, and of duty in the proper sense of the term. It is the morality of the Agnostic, and is opposed to that of the Theist. It is doubtful indeed whether we should apply the term Morality, which has come to imply an obligation, to Utilitarianism. Perhaps it would be better to adopt Mr. Herbert Spencer's term and say Utilitarian Ethics. Mr. Myers, in a somewhat rhapsodical passage about George Eliot, has described her as uttering the words, God, Immortality, Duty, and pronouncing with terrible earnestness how inconceivable was

the first, how unbelievable was the second, and yet how peremptory and absolute was the third. The answer is that neither George Eliot nor anybody else can pronounce Duty peremptory and absolute, or affirm the existence of Duty at all without implying a conception of God, and a belief, if not in Immortality, in a Responsibility and a hope extending beyond the present world. If a particular course is conducive to your health, your profit, your enjoyment, individual or social, it is your ultimate interest to adopt it; but if you choose to prefer anything else, say present pleasure or the gratification of any momentary passion, to your ultimate interest, there is nothing apparently, in Utilitarian and Agnostic philosophy to forbid your doing so. Still less is there anything in Utilitarian and Agnostic philosophy to commend the sacrifice of self-interest altogether.

An interesting lecture on Savonarola was delivered the other day in Toronto by Dr. Barclay. With all his weak points, and in spite of his fatal hallucinations, Savonarola is one of the most striking and memorable embodiments of good struggling against evil. As a reformer who aimed at the foundation of a religious commonwealth he ranks with Calvin, Knox, the English Puritans and the Fathers of New England. Calvin succeeded, after a sharp and wavering struggle with the party of license in Geneva; Knox also succeeded, though as far as the Scotch aristocracy was concerned, less completely, and handed down his theocratic power to Melville and Henderson; the Fathers of New England also succeeded. In all three of these cases not only was the element favourable, but the sphere was limited, and external influences of an adverse character were pretty well excluded. Savonarola, like the English Puritans, failed. He had to contend, not only with a large party of license and of Medicean rule in Florence itself, but with the corrupt Italy of the Renaissance, the fatal influences of which poured into his city, and with the Poppedom of the Borgias. Still, the history of his experiment is fraught with undying interest, not only as an attempt to establish a reign of God on earth, but perhaps even in a higher degree as almost the only historical indication that we have of the real religious tendencies of the Italians. Excepting during the tribunate of Savonarola at Florence, the religious tendencies of the Italians may be said to have been in a state of suppression ever since the rise of the Papacy. The Italians of the north and centre, at all events, were very far from being characterized either by blind superstition, or by slavish submission to Papal despotism: both Florence and Venice took the Pope by the beard in defence of their local privileges; and an aptness for political freedom, such as the Italian Republics displayed, is almost always connected with an aptness for freedom of other kinds. But the Papacy, with the lay authorities which supported it, and the mass of patronage which it dispensed, had always power to strangle heresy and thus to prevent the genuine manifestation of national sentiment. Judging from the episode described in Dr. Barclay's lecture we should suppose that the real tendency of the Florentine was to something Evangelical rather than Ultramontane or Ritualistic, and indications of the same kind are not wanting at the present day.

HOMAGE is due to any man who conscientiously stands up for an unpopular opinion, and especially to one who in this flood-tide of Liberalism stands up for an opinion which is branded as illiberal. We ought therefore to thank Dr. Shedd for having given us in the *North American Review* his reasons for believing in the certainty of Endless Punishment. This tremendous question was once the object of a debate in Knox's Church at Toronto which probably presented as lively an image as anything modern can, of a primitive council. The other day it was revived at Montreal. So far as it turns on the verbal interpretations of Scripture we must respectfully leave it to the theologians, only observing that in this, as in all other cases of verbal interpretation, it is necessary to bear in mind that we have not the actual words of Christ, who spoke Aramaic, whereas the Gospels are in Greek. But so far as the argument in favour of the doctrine purports to be founded on reason it is a fair subject for lay discussion. Punishment must be preventive, corrective or retributive: no other object or motive can reason assign for it. The object of endless punishment cannot be preventive. As little can it be corrective: indeed Dr. Shedd's idea seems to be that under its operation the wicked, being, as he assumes, obdurate, become diabolical, so that instead of being made better they are made worse. The retributive theory remains and it is on this that Dr. Shedd takes his stand. But it is the very essence of retribution that the penalty should be proportioned to the offence; otherwise our moral sense, which it is the object of retributive punishment to satisfy, instead of being satisfied, is outraged. What proportion is there between any sin of which man can possibly be guilty and such a penalty as everlasting torture? "Endless punishment," says Dr. Shedd, "is rational, because sin is an infinite evil; infinite not because committed by an infinite