attack. If ever there was a moment to come to the aid of an ideological ally, this was it. But the Russians and the Chinese contented themselves with some unkind oratory. (And the Chinese were quick to note that, when the bodies of Soviet sailors killed in U.S. raids on Haiphong were returned to the Soviet Union, not a word was published in the Soviet press, so as not to mar President Nixon's visit there.) The President now knew that both Peking and Moscow had given top priority to a détente with the United States - and had downgraded Vietnam.

The coincidence of interest was solidly confirmed.

Impact on allies

This realignment of priorities by the Big Three had an electrifying impact on their former wards and allies. During the storic vi of the cold war, North Korea as mu readjust South Korea, Thailand no less thealities. Philippines or even Japan, patterned But n policies, words and deeds on those old such a powerful patrons. I was in Tokyo detnam. I Dr. Kissinger's first visit to Pekin 1971 th July 1971, and I remember the sturo great impact the event had on the incided. Japanese officials. They were caughils publis awares by this first "Nixon shock" oke of co they heard themselves still speakingary wit language of the cold war at a point w knew the Americans were already using thind. It I tongue of détente. Japanese dipleat Com spoke of the need to "discover ourm, laun Dr. Kissingers", while some of thajor gam tionalist press wrote bleakly of "Am Saigon (betrayal". It was not until 1972 the position new Premier, Kakuei Tanaka, witis too lat

Weighing a new peacekeeping role

External Affairs Minister Mitchell Sharp has set out the Canadian Government's position on the role Canada is being asked to undertake in Vietnam as a member of the proposed four-nation supervisory commission which would become operative in the wake of a negotiated ceasefire.

As of the end of December, the Government had taken no final decision on whether to join such a commission. The Secretary of State for External Affairs said Canada could not do so until the ceasefire negotiations had been completed and full information on the proposed arrangements is available.

In statements and interviews on November 21 and 25 and December 3. Mr. Sharp made it clear that the Canadian Government wished to have assurances on certain points before arriving at a decision. Among the points raised by Mr. Sharp were these:

That the proposed supervisory commission would be acceptable to all the parties concerned – that is, the North Vietnamese, the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam, the Government of South Vietnam and the United States - and that the protocol governing the operations of the commission would be accepted by all four parties;

that there would be a continuing political authority to receive reports from the commission members:

that the procedure for reporting by the commission would be workable;

that the commission would have in cl the necessary freedom of movement On Nove carry out investigations in all parts these m South Vietnam: State W

that there will be arrangemene he held for a member's withdrawal from Rogers commission.

Atlantic While ceasefire negotiations wBrussels under way, the Canadian Governmente cea did announce, on November 2, that cluded, i would be prepared to place at the terms of posal of the new international committees, s sion the services of the Canadian and faci egation to the existing Internatio would have Commission for Supervision and C trol in Vietnam for an initial period ment of was Canada's hope, Mr. Sharp scontemp that this would meet the need until that the international conference, provided ing peac in the proposed ceasefire agreeme were dec enabled Canada as well as the partitary per concerned to determine what, if a would n specially future role Canada could play.

What has been suggested is a the requ posed arrangement to be embodied report o protocol signed by the parties to fire agre agreement that would become operationized in advance of an international confeach of ence and continue after it. Can Canada, sought clarification from the gove ments involved about the structure Canada the proposed new observer commissisaid dur the role it would be expected to play vember Vietnam, its size and terms of referento have Canada's representative in Hanoi unless instructed to explore these questi authorit with North Vietnamese authorities and have Canada's Ambassador in Washing have cle

Mr.