

*The Address—Mr. Adamson*

I shall come to that in a minute. Then the interview continues, and I shall read only a few of the pertinent questions and answers.

Q. What about all this that you hear about some employee being accused and not having any information given to him as to where the charges arise from?

A. Those cases, so far as I have been able to discover, are mostly in the security field, where you don't have to give specific charges, where under the law the head of any one of the ten departments and agencies mentioned, and any others the president may put in, may be told by his security officer—they all have security officers—that he is a "security risk". The head of the agency may suspend him. I have known of cases where a man got a letter telling him that he had been suspended and the reason that he had been suspended was too confidential to tell him. There is something wrong about that, but that has nothing to do with loyalty.

There again you see that the question of dismissal on security grounds also exists in the United States, but when anybody is dismissed in the United States he has an opportunity to state his case, not through the loyalty board but through the officials of the security board of his own department. That is bad enough, but in Canada a man so discharged gets no opportunity at all to state his case to anyone. The article continues:

Q. Why isn't your board empowered to consider the security risk?

A. The president, in the last paragraph of executive order 9835, says, "You will have nothing to do with security cases".

Q. But why is that?

A. It may be because the acts of congress relating to security matters gave the authority to dismiss for security reasons to only a few departments and agencies, whereas the order establishing the loyalty review board is more comprehensive.

Q. Wouldn't it be better if just one board did it?

A. It would be much better, in my opinion. There are a number of times when our panel is in doubt about a person but cannot say that there is a reasonable doubt.

Then it goes on to discuss communist agents and the futility of administering an oath of loyalty to anybody who is a communist. I will not read that part but it is of great importance. I come now to the actions of the board, and it reads as follows:

Q. They have what they call "security officers"—

He is referring to the individual departments of the United States.

—in a department, for example. Do their reports go to a loyalty board?

A. No, that's security. But in most departments it is the same board. In the state department the board is called the loyalty and security board. The commerce department is the only one that separates them, and has a loyalty board and a security board.

Q. Such a double board, then, might know from security channels damaging facts that could be used in judgment on the loyalty question?

A. Yes.

[Mr. Adamson.]

Q. Does anybody keep any check on the disloyal former employees, what becomes of them afterwards, where they go to get jobs, whether they drift back into these communist-front organizations?

A. No.

Then it goes on, and I will read one more passage. It is as follows:

Q. How do they (the discharged employees) make a living?

A. Having chosen to act in a manner which led the loyalty review board to find a reasonable doubt as to their loyalty, they have put themselves in a very bad position to get a job requiring loyalty . . . and find it extremely hard to get subsequent employment.

Q. When they are dismissed from the government, they are dismissed because they are assumed to be dangerous, or disloyal, and then they go somewhere else to get a job where they might continue their disloyalty?

A. They have to try to get a job. We never publish the names. We give no publicity to any of our activities. If there's any publicity, it is all given by the man himself or his counsel.

**Mr. McCulloch:** Mr. Speaker, on a question of privilege may I ask if the hon. member is supposed to read from a magazine to such an extent that the quotation constitutes the whole speech?

**Mr. Deputy Speaker:** The hon. member has been reading quotations from a magazine. I think he has given the quotations and is coming to the end.

**Mr. Adamson:** Yes, Mr. Speaker, I am coming to the end shortly. I am doing this in order to show the set-up of the loyalty boards and the security machinery in the United States. This is hardly an editorial. It is merely the statement of the head of the loyalty board in the United States. It goes on to say that a man, if discharged for security or disloyalty reasons, has great difficulty, and in fact finds it impossible to get a job after he has been so discharged. I continue the quotation:

Problem of unfairness

Q. But can't there be some way for all the problems to be dealt with centrally?

That is, loyalty and security.

A. The only criticism that I have to make of the program as it is at present is that the individual has no right of appeal from a decision on security outside the agency. If the security officer makes up his mind that this person is a bad risk, that person can be heard by the agency, but—perhaps you remember in the middle of July the president decided that this question needed investigation by the national security council. He is the chairman of it himself. About the middle of July he wrote a letter to the executive secretary of the national security council, asking the council to investigate the question of security and the charges of unfairness, and to make recommendations to see if anything should be done about it.

In the United States you have the question raised about unfairness but there, if a man is discharged as a bad security risk, he has