

military power which had reached the first order of magnitude. At sea the U.S. Navy had become at least equivalent to that of the United Kingdom; the Jellicoe Mission of 1919 made it clear to us in no uncertain terms that in the face of the new United States sea power and having regard to the attenuation of naval power with distance, it was impractical even to contemplate the operation of the British Fleet on this side of the Atlantic.

There were at the time, as has always been the case on the conclusion of a major war, anxieties and jealousies, and incipient ill feeling between late allies. Certainly we were no exception and it was consideration of possible eventualities from the south that led to the retention in 1919 of the 12 Divisional organization in Canada, an organization which had been contemplated in an earlier era to absorb the whole of our manpower for use in a short intense effort pending reinforcement from overseas or the relief of pressure by the action of the British Navy against the coasts of the United States.

Today these ideas seem very strange and unreal. It is quite true that by 1919 they were outmoded and impracticable, but nevertheless such attitudes persist long after the passing of the conditions which brought them into existence and their effects have a disturbing way of coming to life when they should long since have been forgotten. For this reason, among others, it was not until the 1930's that we were able to bring our Army establishment in Canada to a 6 Division basis in keeping with our manpower available for use in a war of long duration overseas, and to dispense with the scores of unwanted units whose mere existence had been a dead load on our progress toward military efficiency.

Canadian effort in World War I was principally in the Army. Our Naval expansion was not large and in the Air our personnel were absorbed in the R.F.C., later the R.A.F. and in the R.N.A.S. In 1918 Canadians were reported to have constituted over 40% of the total flying personnel in the R.A.F. and R.N.A.S. combined. This condition of organization with the use of our men under other than Canadian command was not acceptable to the Government and people of Canada and in the last few months of the war a commencement was made in the organization of Canadian Fighter Squadrons overseas. Later the R.C.A.F. was organized in Canada, but in its early years it suffered most seriously from the fact that there had been no Canadian Air Force formations and Commands during the war.

The post World War I period was marked by two most important transitions in Canada. The first was the transition from Colonial dependence to Dominion responsibility; the second was the transition from an attitude of suspicion of the United States towards that full measure of mutual confidence which exists today.

By 1921 it was evident to students of international affairs that Japan was on the war path. There was the Anglo-Japanese Treaty which had served us well in bringing Japan in on our side against Germany in 1914. But this Treaty contained clauses which were susceptible to interpretation as requiring the intervention of the British Empire on the side of Japan in certain circumstances against the United States. Feeling in the U.S.A., particularly in the western states, was running high against the people of the Rising Sun across