

policymakers will find is the one they must fashion in Ottawa between the myriad players who supposedly have a stake in foreign policy formulation and outcomes. **However, forging some mechanism beyond ad hoc interdepartmental committees to control coalition policies is a decisive matter.** The new mechanism ought to take a Canadian perspective and thus it should not be composed of "representatives" sent by departments. The mechanism should be especially designed to build coherence between intentions and outcomes. In this regard, the mechanism might best be situated under a minister who has responsibility for the resources that change coalition intentions into fact so long as the minister's decisions are carefully guided by a strong national strategy.

Joining Ends to Means Michael Ignatieff, commenting on the need to use force to defend human rights, concluded that "if we will the ends, we had better will the right means. For the means we select may betray our ends."²¹ The warning is germane to Canada's situation and the growing disparity between what Canadians wish to do in international affairs, what they think Canada can do, and what capabilities are really available now and may be available in the future to do anything meaningful. The arguments between military experts may not be comprehensible to everyone, but even an informed casual observer would understand that in the long term – say out to 2020 – if budgets remain constant relative to today, the Canadian Forces will have fewer resources and fewer people to deal with a world that is most likely to be more, not less, turbulent. Notwithstanding that some capabilities will certainly be greatly enhanced and "more lethal," it is not certain that they will be especially suited to the usual pattern of international security affairs; that is, to situations short of conventional war.

A national foreign and defence strategy for 2020 must join ends to means and allocate resources appropriately between strategic imperatives and strategic choices. Care must be taken to avoid the allure of "double-hatting" assets (assigning multiple duties to the same resources) to cover gaps in capabilities because it leads to the assumption, which will invariably be proved false in a crisis, that all contingencies are covered and that one person or one unit can be everywhere and do everything all the time. Matching Canadians' will to national means would be a critical item on any agenda to craft a coherent coalition strategy for Canada.

Canada, Helpful Fixer or Helpful Follower? In 1963, Robert Sutherland, a respected senior defence analyst, declared in a paper on national strategy which he had prepared for defence minister, Paul Hellyer, that:

There is . . . a distinct limit to how far one can define a Canadian position in advance of discussions with our allies. In the course of such discussions it must be anticipated that Canada's position would be necessarily subject to reconsideration and redefinition . . . the most that is possible at the present time is to define an "initial" Canadian position, accepting the fact that this position might require substantial revision in the course of discussions.

From the point of view of the Department of National Defence, it would be highly advantageous to discover a strategic rationale which would impart to Canada's defence programs

²¹. Michael Ignatieff, *Virtual War: Kosovo and Beyond*. (New York: Henry Holt, 2000).