

all facilities handling dangerous amounts of these fissionable materials, and thus would control directly all the atomic energy activities in all nations which might become a potential menace to world security.

A licensing and inspection system is contemplated under the majority plan for activities of a less dangerous character, and it is provided that the authority would foster beneficial uses and research in nationally-owned establishments, limited to non-dangerous quantities. It is proposed that this system of control should be set up by stages, and after it is fully in operation, the manufacture of atomic weapons would cease, existing stocks would be disposed of, and the nuclear fuel would be converted to peaceful uses.

The Soviet Government's plans for the international control of atomic energy, which were presented originally in June, 1946, and elaborated upon in June, 1947, call for the immediate outlawing of the atomic bomb, and the destruction of all existing stocks of weapons "within a three-month period". The Government of the U.S.S.R. has admitted that international inspection and investigation is a necessary condition of any plan for international control, but it has been unwilling to accept any proposals providing for continuous inspection, and has also insisted that inspection be confined to such facilities and materials as it chooses to declare. In addition, the Soviet Government maintains that any international atomic energy authority must be subject to the jurisdiction of the Security Council, which would mean that the Permanent Members of the Security Council could use their veto to prevent any effective action, if it should be found that they were illegally producing nuclear fuel or otherwise seriously violating international atomic controls.

The discussions in the Atomic Energy Commission in 1948 were confined to a detailed examination of the Soviet Government's proposals of June, 1947, and to the study of the organizational structure of an international control agency.

An exhaustive examination of the Soviet Union's proposals led a majority of the members of the Commission to the view that they were inadequate to provide a basis for an international control of atomic energy which would give the nations of the world a sense of security. The views of the majority of the Commission are stated in the third report in the following terms:

"in the field of atomic energy, the majority of the Commission has been unable to secure the agreement of the Soviet Union to even these elements of effective control considered essential from the technical point of view, let alone their acceptance of the nature and the extent of participation in the world community required of all nations in this field by the first and second reports of the Atomic Energy Commission."

The majority of the governments represented on the Atomic Energy Commission were of the opinion, therefore, that the Soviet Union's proposals offered no real safeguard against the diversion of atomic materials to illegal uses or the concealment of atomic installations engaged in the production of nuclear fuel.

The third report of the Atomic Energy Commission, prepared in May, 1948, outlined the work of the Commission during 1948 and stated that the differences between the