

(Mr. Rahardjo, Indonesia)

chemical weapons lies in the possible use or threat of use of these weapons, rather than the development or stockpiling of these weapons. In this context, the importance of provisions regulating assistance and protection in case of the use or threat of use of chemical weapons could well be emphasized in order to create a deterrent and thus lessen the chance of countries choosing chemical weapons for aggressive military purposes. My delegation also attaches particular importance to the provision governing the future possibility of the use or threat of use of such weapons by States which are not party to the convention. A provision which assures prompt assistance and protection to a State party which might be threatened or attacked by any State using chemical weapons may attract States to become party to the convention.

In the course of the negotiations of the last few years, the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons has not been able to reach agreement on the above question, which is due among other reasons to the thorny question of the threat of use of chemical weapons. Moreover, the question of the function of the future technical secretariat in providing assistance to States parties in need of assistance in case of the threat of use or use of chemical weapons has remained unresolved. If these pending questions are to be resolved, a new approach has to be developed. Any State or States parties to the convention which renounce chemical weapons options for their defence purposes and become parties to the convention should be entitled to receive assistance or protection against the use or threat of use of chemical weapons, with a view to preventing the real use of such weapons against this particular State or States parties. My delegation hopes that those which are in a position to do so will make a contribution either in cash, or in kind, through the assistance mechanism to be created under the auspices of the technical secretariat. At the same time efforts should also be pursued to make the technical secretariat function effectively so as to enable it to give prompt assistance to countries in need.

With regard to the interrelationship between the future chemical weapons convention and the 1925 Geneva Protocol, my delegation would like to emphasize that the provision governing such a relationship should be carefully and properly drafted so as to fully reflect the concerns and aspirations of the States parties to the convention. The future chemical weapons convention should avoid any possible confusion or loopholes which may lead to abuse by any State which is party to both the future convention and the 1925 Geneva Protocol.

While it is encouraging to note the wealth of ideas which have been put forward during the course of the negotiations on the convention on chemical weapons, my delegation considers it necessary to mention a number of points which are of relevance to us. With reference to the verification of non-production of chemical weapons in the chemical industry, we are all aware that a new concept based on an integrated approach has been introduced. This has altered the perceived concept of verification as envisaged in the "rolling text" of the last session of the Conference on Disarmament; among others the range of the target to be verified has been widened. The concept of "capable" facilities allows on-site inspection not only in those facilities which produce but also those which are able to produce or process scheduled