

&c., the *who*, in each case, following the sentence that contains its only possible antecedent, *him*, and introducing (or taking the lead in) its own clause, which must contain the verb *instructs*, being in the singular form.

So, in a simple sentence (or single clause), containing a declinable and an indeclinable element, the form of the declinable word determines, not only its own office, but usually, also that of the indeclinable ones. For example: *He loved God*, or *God he loved*, *Loved he God*, &c. The relative position of the elements matters not, so long as there is a subjective form (*he*) in the sentence. So in the expression of SHAKESPEARE, "Sayest so?—sayest so?—I say unto thee again," &c., the form of the verb, "sayest," renders the sentence perfectly determinate, admitting of only one possible subject (*thou*).

But where *neither* of the elements varies in form, the expression requires to be looked at, as already remarked, through that other eye,—*position* alone leading to its correct synthesis, or true analysis. Thus, whether "The whale swallowed Jonah," or "Jonah swallowed the whale," depends alone on the position of the two nouns. The composer knows which of the thoughts he designs to express, and assigns to the elements of the sentence their position and consequent offices accordingly; and the analyser, or interpreter, decides on their respective offices, and the consequent thought, by their position.

It would be in place here, though not in time, to remark also on the relative position of the several adjuncts of the sentence, whether these adjuncts are words, phrases, or sentences. It may be, however, admissible to state that verbal position in the English language often distinguishes not only the office of the sentential elements, but also the several kinds of sentences as dependent on construction.

Thus, placing the subject before the verb, constitutes the sentence *declarative*, or assertive; as "He writes, or can write English." Placing the verb, in one of its declinable forms, before the subject, makes it *interrogative*; as, "Writes he, or can he write, English?" Placing the simple root of the verb before the subject, in the second person, makes the sentence *imperative*; as, "Write thou, or you (usually omitted), English."

It may perhaps be well to add the two inferential remarks.

1. Nowhere is there a more clear illustration of the doctrine that analysis begins where synthesis ends, and vice versa, than in the structure of language.

In synthesis, the thought to be expressed leads to the office of the several words selected to express it; and this office again to the several forms or positions requisite to indicate their office. In analysis, on the contrary, the verbal form or position is obviously the first thing to be noticed, and this form or position of the several words indicates their several offices, and these again the thought that *had been* expressed by the composer.

Hence it is obvious that the terms *office* and *form* in Grammar are not co-ordinate, as the latter must, in the nature of the case, be subordinate and indicative of the former; but that the proper co-ordinate terms are *form* and *position*; the office of the words being the grand object of the analyzer's inquiry. Thus, in the sentence: "And all the air a solemn stillness holds"—as soon as the office of the elements "air" and "stillness" is ascertained, the end of the analysis is attained.

II. It is also easy to infer from the foregoing principles and illustrations the limitation of *Rhetorical Transposition* in the simple sentence. It must be limited by the changes in the forms of the sentential elements, so far at least as the Grammatical Construction is concerned, irrespective of the relations of the thoughts expressed. To recur to a single illustration: "They instruct him" may be transposed or inverted *ad libitum*, without the least danger of ambiguity, as the offices of the elements are clearly indicated by their subjective and objective forms. Thus, "Him they instruct," "Him instruct they," "Instruct they him," "Instruct him they," are all equally intelligible; for but one construction is possible. But where the forms of the elements are invariable, how can the thought remain unchanged when the subject takes the place of the object? In the expression, "Jonah swallowed the whale," who would suspect "whale," to be the subjective word, and "Jonah" the objective, unless he was compelled by the argument or logical connection?

In what are emphatically termed *transpositive languages*, especially the Greek and the Latin, the same principle of transposition also holds true. But the changes in verbal form being much more extensive and numerous than in the English, French, and some other modern languages; so is also the corresponding transpositive power. For instance, while most of these changes in English are confined to the personal pronoun and the verb,—about six in each of the former, and five or six in the simple form of the latter—in

the Greek and Latin no less than six or seven of the nine parts of speech are varied in their gender, number, and case, and the verb, in voice, mode, tense, number, and person, amounting to thousands of changes rung on a single word; and to no less than forty-five words, in declining a single adnominal word in the Greek; to say nothing of their nouns and pronouns. Indeed, the transpositive resources of these languages are such as rarely to be all called into requisition, even by their poets; while the purposes of rhetoric, especially in versification, require us rather to transcend our grammatical limits in this respect. Select almost any stanza from the English poet already quoted:

"Th' applause of list'ning senates to command," &c.
"Their lot forbade";

or from Dr. YOUNG,

"Which but to guess a Newton made immortal";

and who does not perceive, and especially in the latter, a palpable ambiguity, arising from the uncertain claims of two or three words to the office of subject to the verb? But the Latin or Greek writers could say the same thing, in a still more inverted order, with perfect clearness and precision of thought, for the terminational form of the noun would at once determine its office. (1).

And yet even these languages, perfect as they are grammatically, are still liable to ambiguity, arising from verbal definition. Any tyro knows that the Latin words *pugno pugnans pugnans*, may be read into three sentences, "I fight, thou fightest, he fights," or may constitute a single proposition, "he fights battles with his fist," two of the persons of the verb being identical with two cases of nouns.

And again—to close this "Thought," protracted too far, perhaps, already—let us suppose an ancient Roman matron, viewing a class of the population to be only "things," should pettishly say of a domestic—

"Mea serva est mala res,"
"My servant is an ugly (2) thing"

and the servant, justly provoked, and using the "liberty of December, should angrily retort:—

"Mea domina est mala fera,"
"My mistress is a wicked beast";

this problem in analysis presents itself: Of how many English renderings is one of these Latin sentences fairly susceptible?—allowing a lexicographical ambiguity to at least four of the Latin words. The subject is, in modern parlance, "suggestive;" and each reader, after being put on the right track, may follow it out to his liking. Before arriving at the end of the matter, however, he will have made between sixty and one hundred and twenty versions.

For example:

1. [As above] "My servant is an ugly thing."
2. "My ugly servant is [only] a thing."
3. "Go, servant, it is a bad thing." [affair]
4. "Save the evil [calamity] the property is mine."
5. "Go [run], the slavish thing is eating the apples."

Things sometimes had mouths in Rome, as they now have in some of the United States; for

6. "The thing is my ugly slave." [at any rate]
7. "The ugly slave is my thing." [and]
8. "The slave is my ugly thing." [then]
9. "Save, the, the bad affair is mine." [yea]
10. "Run—save—the—property is apples." [which are very scarce this year; and]
11. "My slavish thing is eating the apples."
12. "A bad affair [truly] is my slave!"

&c., &c., to the end of the chapter—which will not be so easy to find as its beginning, judging from the nature of arithmetical combinations and permutations,

The Dangers to which we, as Public Educators, are Exposed, Arising from Popular Opinions.

I will assume the attitude of a young, but somewhat experienced, counsellor, and attempt a calm but brief investigation of the accu-

- (1) "Quod conjicere modo Newtonem fecit immortalē."
- (2) In the Yankee sense.