

some preparation was evidently made to wards the approaching crisis of compulsory service, for in his Army Act he so far modified the ballot for the Militia as to abrogate, we hope for ever, the power of a balloted man, whatever be his rank or wealth, to purchase or provide a substitute to do the duty to bear arms for his country which every freeman should feel it an honour to perform. We have no doubt but this restriction of the Ballot Act will vouch to the general public its justice and propriety when it is put into force. We grant that there are positions in life in which military service might be a very great hardship under certain conditions. The Act of Parliament to which we refer has very prudently provided for cases of this sort, without permitting the subject to escape the privilege of serving his country under arms. The Volunteer service becomes the safety valve against hardship of this nature, for the act provides that any efficient Volunteer, under one year's engagement of service, is relieved from the operation of the Militia ballot, and shall render his service in the Volunteer ranks. It is thus that the Volunteer service can become a source of enormous strength to the nation, and, at the same time, a mighty boon to those who can afford to give their service for nothing, or whose service apart from their places of business would be detrimental to the commercial or manufacturing interests of the nation. We do not intend taking up our space with minute details, but we think that out of the Militia and Volunteer services it is possible to supply a magnificent regular army of trained men—an army which need not be above 60,000 men in time of peace, to supply only our foreign reliefs—but with such an amount of pay as would induce the best blood and most adventurous spirits among the Militia and Volunteers to seek voluntary service in the regular ranks. The Sergeant Kites of Glasgow Cross would find their occupation gone, while the saving in the training of recruits at regular depots would go far towards meeting the increase of the regular soldier's pay. Every Militia man we would make serve one year consecutively, and one month every year during his term of service. The Government might do what they liked almost with the Volunteers, who will render any amount of service and efficiency within reasonable demand, and we do not doubt the possibility that so great might be the influx to the Volunteer ranks that the Militia demands would be very small indeed. In Canada the system provides a force sufficiently large to render the Militia ballot unnecessary. Compulsory service we believe inevitable, but compulsory service in the regular army—the dreaded conscription—we believe under some such form of Militia and Volunteer service, would be unnecessary. We have little faith in the mere increase of pay question, because we do not think the taxpayers would submit to it; and, further, because we do not believe it would in itself be sufficient to induce powerful and respectable young men of intelligence to enter the ranks. Out of three or four hundred thousand Militiamen on small pay, and Volunteers on no pay at all, we believe there could be evoked sufficient military enthusiasm as to fill the ranks of the regular army, if the regular service opened up privileges to them in after life. The question is a wide and broad one. It will evidently form one of the subjects of interest and discussion in the coming session of Parliament; and as Europe now stands with its ever amassing armaments, it is one which must receive anxious consideration.—*Volunteer News*, Dec. 23.

The Condition of The Navy.

Speech of Mr. Archer, of Maryland, on the Naval Appropriation bill, in the House of Representatives, December 22, 1871:

Mr. Chairman, we stand to-day in a most humiliating position, considering the high ground we have taken, first in proclaiming the Monroe doctrine, second in claiming exemption from the right of search, on which matter we went to war with England in 1812, and assert that we are ready to do so against Spain should she interfere with vessels bearing our flag. At this moment we are without suitable ships, without guns, and without men to man the few vessels we have; and only by accident have we been saved from a humiliating war, in which the people of the United States would have been greatly disappointed in the results. Everybody has been led to believe that we had one hundred and sixty nine ships of war, when we have really thirty two sea worthy steamers and eight ironclads. With these our officers are expected to contend against a navy fitted with all the modern improvements, having eight or ten heavy sea going ironclads, fourteen or fifteen large and swift frigates, besides four or five very heavy sea going iron clads rapidly advancing to completion. And here arises a difficulty we must always experience in case of sudden emergency. No doubt in the course of a great war, when our commerce was laid up, we would ultimately be able to man a number of ships, not with such seamen as are required for immediate action, but with material that could be worked into shape in the course of three or four months.

An army, as has been demonstrated time after time, can be improvised almost immediately from the rawest material. It is merely teaching men to load and fire a musket and drill, and manoeuvre in companies and regiments. This can be fairly learned in two weeks, although of course it takes time to make a perfect soldier. But it requires months of constant drill to enable a ship of war to be prepared to hold her own in action against the well drilled and well manoeuvred war vessels of the present day.

Congress allows the Navy but eighty five hundred seamen, which many suppose are all employed at sea, but a large portion are necessarily stationed in receiving ships, store ships, school ships, transports, navy-yard tugs, etc., and but a small force is left to man the vessels actually employed in active service. Many of our ships abroad are sixty men short, and few of them have their proper complement. Can any one expect a frigate of four hundred men to contend successfully with one of five hundred? Common sense would convince any one of the absurdity of this.

In all these matters, as we seem to have no originality, we must adopt the ideas of foreigners, at least those whose defeats have taught them the necessity of perfect system in organizing their navies.

We have had some remarkable successes against great odds. In 1812, we obtained advantage over England with our handful of frigates, because she was then neglecting the very matter that we are neglecting now, not educating seamen expressly for the Naval Service, and it was not until the navy of France under the late Emperor had reached a point of excellence it never before attained, that the English determined to reorganize their system and educate their own seamen. The apprentice system was estab-

lished, and now all the ships of the British navy are manned with native seamen, from whom are made up the ordinary seamen, seamen gunners, and petty officers. The English have at present in commission thirty four vessels devoted to the purpose of naval training, including twelve ships of the line for training apprentices, eight tenders to the same, four large ships for gunners' practice, and nine ships and one tender for coast guard drill, and it is now proposed to extend this system to the North American colonies, where England has a reserve of eighty thousand seamen.

From these facts it will be seen how little attention we have paid to matters of so much importance. When we fit out a ship, men are picked up haphazard at different naval rendezvous, at least 50 per cent. being foreigners with little or no interest in the country or devotion to the flag, and ready at the first favorable opportunity to desert. A ship going to sea in a hurry, manned by such a heterogeneous mob without sufficient time to properly station her men or instruct them in their duties, would fall an easy prey to an enemy's vessel of much inferior size. The frigate *Colorado* was not long since taken from the row of vessels, laid up a sheer hulk, and fifteen days afterward she sailed fully manned and armed for Cuban waters. Her crew only went on board four days before she sailed, and no country could reasonably expect a ship to fight under such circumstances and not disgrace her flag.

The best officers of the Navy could not even work the men into their places, much less instruct them in the art of loading, aiming, and firing in the short space of time allowed the crew. The crew of a vessel would not know their places and would be a mere target for a well drilled enemy's shot.

We keep constantly at sea thirty four vessels, or just about the number of training ships alone in the British navy, while she maintains in commission on foreign and home stations two hundred vessels of all classes. The thirty four United States ships are scattered all over the globe, never more than six being allotted to one station. The six vessels are again scattered so that they seldom if ever come together in one squadron.

How are officers to perfect themselves in fleet sailing and battle formations under such circumstances; and what chance would they have of contending with a well drilled force of foreign ships, for now almost all sea fighting will be done in order of battle? What chance would a regiment of soldiers composed of companies hastily brought together with no previous training stand in a contest with a well drilled force of equal numbers? And yet it is much more important that ships should be thoroughly trained in fleet tactics before attempting to give battle to an enemy's squadron.

Fleets are nowadays manoeuvred in battle under steam as troops are upon land, and a single false move would throw a whole line into confusion and make the ships an easy prey to an enemy. The British, French, Russians, and all other people of any naval pretensions, except the Americans, have large practice squadrons constantly employed in drilling officers and men. The British Channel fleet is composed of twenty five of their heaviest iron clads, which are kept so constantly in motion that all manoeuvres are like clockwork. In this way a thorough knowledge of the art of war is gained by officers and men throughout the service, and ships can join any squadron and at once take their place in line and perform the duty required of them. The same may be