

patriotism. They have not presumed to thrust advice upon the leaders of the Liberal Party, but as each stage has been passed in the development of the crisis they have offered comments which have constantly formed a rebuke—possibly unintentional, but none the less effective—to the utterances of those in the more responsible position. The following words are among many which Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman and Mr. Morley have no doubt read lately, and by which we can only regret that they have not profited.

As Liberals we must have a certain respect for men who are fighting thus bravely for their independence. But as Englishmen, we cannot forget that the triumph at which they aim would be fatal to the British Empire in South Africa, and perhaps beyond South Africa. If then we are not prepared for any such catastrophe, we may keep the olive-branch ready, as Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman says, but while the war lasts, and while the Boers reject all possible conciliation, we must be in favour of carrying on the war vigorously, that it may be speedily concluded. The logic of war admits of no halfway house. . . . Therefore it is useless to declaim against war until and unless we are prepared to make peace, as at present we are not.

The root fact is that after nearly two years of war the Boers, according to our information, want the condition precedent of peace to be a recognition that they are a sovereign international State.

There has been hardly any time during the later stages of the war when these words would not have been in season: those which follow are for the present crisis.

We believe, as we have often said, that this war has been as humane as any war could possibly be.

We cannot acquit the Boers of responsibility, nor have we any sympathy with a line of criticism which confuses soldiers with politicians, and fulminates against both as if, in making war, they were guilty of a crime.

But the extreme sections who act thus are . . . a very small minority, and the duty of leaders is not to side with them but to control them.

Here we have the groundwork of our argument laid for us with no uncertain hand: nothing further is needed but to add the inevitable conclusion. The responsibility is great, and personal loyalty pulls at this son of Issachar as at so many others: "if a third leader were to be sacrificed in five years the