

the strategic concept of the alliance still valid? Is it time to leave the defence of Europe to the Europeans?" These are questions that are being asked at the present time, and they are fair questions. Naturally, by virtue of my own responsibilities, I have been asking myself some of these questions. It may be helpful if I began what I have to say on the situation in NATO resulting from the French action by summarizing the main elements of the position now taken by our NATO ally, France. These comprise:

(1) a decision to withdraw French forces from NATO's integrated military structure and French officers from the integrated headquarters, these decisions to take effect on July 1, 1966;

(2) a decision to require the removal from France of the two integrated military headquarters known as SHAPE and the Central European Command. France has proposed that the removal be completed by April 1, 1967;

(3) a decision to require the withdrawal from France of foreign forces and bases. France has proposed that the United States and Canadian bases be withdrawn by April 1, 1967;

(4) France has indicated a wish to retain its forces in Germany, while transferring them from NATO to French command.

(5) France intends to leave its forces in Berlin, where they are established on the basis of occupation rights and where there is a tripartite command.

(6) France has indicated a willingness to negotiate arrangements for establishing, in peacetime, French liaison missions with NATO commands.

(7) France has indicated a readiness to enter into separate conversations with Canada and the United States to determine the military facilities which the respective governments might mutually grant to each other in wartime.

(8) France intends to remain a party to the North Atlantic Treaty and to participate in the activities of the NATO Council. This, as I understand it, is the position taken by the government of France.

● (10.30 a.m.)

It is only fair to note that these positions have been previously stated, in one form or another, by the President of the French Republic during the last two years.

This last element of the French position is naturally welcomed by the Canadian government as an indication of France's desire to continue its formal association with the other parties to the Treaty. It will, I need hardly add, be the concern of the Canadian government to encourage French participation to the greatest extent feasible.

It is evident that some of the French objectives can be attained by unilateral action; for example, the withdrawal of French troops from SACEUR's command and of French officers from the combined headquarters. Some other objectives will require negotiations over modalities and the timing; for example, the withdrawal of NATO headquarters and of foreign bases from French territory. Finally, some proposals depend on working out arrangements with other members of the Alliance and will involve negotiations on substance; for example, the presence and role of French troops in Germany and the liaison arrangements which might be established between French and NATO commands.

It must be clear to the members of the committee that the French proposals raise a host of problems, the range of which has not been fully determined.