

and juries and prosecutors will all take into account the specific circumstances of any case which might arise.

The Committee considers that this uncertainty with respect to the status of the individual serviceman is unsatisfactory. Given the increased possibility of the use of Canadian Armed Forces for internal security duties as envisaged in the White Paper—and the parallel possibility that these charged with enforcement of order may be provoked to violent action as a matter of deliberate tactic—it recommends that this ambiguous position be clarified as soon as possible.

The real utility of Canadian Armed Forces—

The White Paper states that “emergencies (may) again arise which will necessitate the Canadian Forces coming to the aid of the civil power”. (p. 11) This does not indicate in detail the specific assistance that the Canadian Armed Forces are expected to provide. The Committee believes the primary contribution of the Canadian Forces in recent instances has been trained and disciplined manpower, the symbolic value of actually bringing in the Canadian Armed Forces and the specialized training and equipment that the Canadian Forces have—particularly in communications and land and air transport. In this respect some of the comments of Mr. Smart were particularly germane:

“Military forces command today a number of skills which are of growing relevance to internal security, but only a few of those skills are uniquely or strictly military in the sense of being exclusively associated with the use of threat of potentially lethal force. In a very large number of cases, if you look at the record, military forces are only called upon for internal security duties because they constitute a reservoir of trained manpower; because they possess a highly organized command structure; because they have high mobility on land, sea and air, at long range and at short range, and because they can deploy an efficient communication system.” (Issue No. 6, page 12).

The Committee has concluded that there should be a more explicit recognition of this fact. It is important that the public recognize that primarily the armed forces are providing trained and disciplined manpower, communications, transport and other facilities rather than using weapons and threatening force, as this affects the perspective in which the Canadian Armed Forces are viewed.

Reserve Forces for internal security—

The White Paper states that “generally speaking the role of the Reserves is to support the Regular Force. In particular the Reserves provide trained officers and men for augmentation and reinforcement and they have a particularly important role in internal security contingency plans”. (p. 46) When questioned as to whether past use of armed forces for internal security operations had strained Canada’s capability of meeting other defence

commitments and whether reserve forces would be used, the Minister of National Defence added that:

“... the troops handled the crisis of 1970 very well. It does put a strain on the forces, of course, if numbers have to be moved to a particular area of Canada at a particular time If one had to do the same kind of operation in several places in Canada at the same time, then one would have to consider using reserve forces at that particular time”. (Issue No. 1, page 12).

The Committee subsequently received evidence that Reserve Forces would be used in internal security operations “... to the extent that the commanders of the Commands concerned considered them qualified to fulfill”. (Issue No. 18, page 19). The same departmental witness elaborated that in this regard, reserves would be used in a support function for “... (at) base or handling of logistic support for those people who are engaged in the actual front line duty.”

The Committee endorses these statements and in particular the emphasis on use of reserve forces in a support role and the importance attached to using reserves who have adequate training.

Public concern about the use of the Canadian Armed Forces for internal security—

While almost all persons submitting written briefs to your Committee expressed praise for the manner in which the Canadian Armed Forces had conducted themselves in carrying out recent internal security duties, a significant number also emphasized that in addition we must be concerned about economic, institutional and social reform to remove the causes of most threats to internal security and the proper equipping, manning and training of the regular police forces. Mr. Smart’s evidence reflected this general attitude and also pointed to dangers inherent in their use at all under certain circumstances.

“Just as any force used for internal security should think of itself as operating within and on behalf of its own national community, so then society as a whole must be able to think of a military force as its own representative, as the embodiment, if you like, of the nation in arms.” (Issue No. 6, page 11).

The Committee agrees that in principle, Canada should rely upon regular police forces to maintain internal security but that in a critical situation, the Canadian Armed Forces must, as a last resort, be available to maintain internal security. The Committee also believes if so used the period should be as brief as possible.

The Committee believes that the present manpower, training and equipment available in particular to Mobile Command is adequate for assisting in the maintenance of internal security on a relatively small scale. If unrest shows signs of increasing, the Committee believes the emphasis should be on the strengthening and im-