

military proved quite unrealistic in the light of the political and economic capabilities of the countries involved. At the meeting of the NATO Council in Lisbon in 1952 an attempt was made to adjust the minimum requirements for conventional forces to the capabilities of the member nations but, as you know, these force requirements were never achieved.

The increasing cost of new equipment made it apparent that the Lisbon goals were beyond the reach of NATO countries. In 1954, with the prospects of tactical nuclear weapons and increasing German participation, it was thought feasible to reduce the shield forces objectives to a more manageable and attainable size. The realization that in all probability there would be no time in the initial stages for reinforcements pointed to the necessity for highly trained shield forces - ready and in position.

Complementing the shield, we have the sword consisting of the retaliatory forces of your Strategic Air Command augmented by the United Kingdom Bomber Command. At first the United States possessed a great superiority in the power of the sword. Our strategy was for our shield forces to hold off an attack until our retaliatory forces could be brought into effect. However, since then the Soviet Union has developed, with great success, its own nuclear bombs, with the capacity to deliver them, and we now know that the use of such weapons by either side would result in the utmost devastation.

The shield and the sword remain inseparable but we realized in Paris that in view of the consequences resultant upon the use of the sword the effectiveness of our shield forces acquires added importance.

Theoretically, these shield forces could be built up to match the Russians in conventional arms. This, however, would involve a strain on the economy that could lead to a lowering of living standards which in turn might encourage the growth within NATO countries of the very thing we are out of fight - Communism.

Viewed in this light, the Defence Ministers of NATO have agreed, in principle, that our shield force goals should be retained at approximately their present numerical strength but that, in addition, conventional arms require to be augmented with tactical nuclear weapons.

It is imperative that our shield forces be of such strength that they will be able to ascertain whether an attack is merely a probing effort or the advance guard of an all-out onslaught. Without a strong shield the Soviet might try, perhaps employing the forces of one of its satellites, to eat up Europe bit by bit, hoping no one foray is considered important enough to start World War III. Under such circumstances the