rest of us in any way to a unification of Germany by force or a restoration by force of lost German territories. We should make that perfectly clear, both to the Germans and to the Communist powers, as we face these problems in the days ahead.

It will be argued, as it has already been argued, that German association with the West will be considered by the Soviet Empire as an irrevocably aggressive move, will remove any hope of ending the cold war, and will increase the danger of it becoming a hot one. The short answer to this argument is that the aggressive policy of Soviet imperialism has itself made necessary the participation of Germany in our plans for collective defence. Until there is a genuine change in that policy, we would be foolish to allow either Soviet threats or Soviet blandishments to affect the arrangements we consider necessary, and these do include a German contribuion to the common defence.

While, then, there are difficulties and even some dangers in the policy of full and integral German association with the Western collective system, is there any alternative which would not be not only more difficult, but also more dangerous to peace?

One such alternative is to keep Germany neutralized and disarmed.

This solution may have its appeal, especially to those who have suffered from the might of German arms. It is one which, under certain conditions, might have been practicable as well as acceptable. Unfortunately, those conditions do not exist. If it was impossible to keep Germany neutral and disarmed in the twenties, how can that be done now, with the victors of the last war divided and bitterly hostile, and in the face of the control of a rearmed Communist East Germany by an aggressive mighty Russian imperialist power. Is Russia likely to give up that control for a genuine international system of supervision of a united Germany which, in its turn, assumes a situation where the East and West would work amicably and altruistically together for a common peaceful purpose? The question answers itself from the history of the last 10 years. And even if it were possible, how long would a dynamic, powerful and proud people like the Germans be willing to accept a position of this kind?

The neutralization and disarmament of Germany, in short, would be difficult under any conditions; impossible under present ones. It would, in any event, leave Germany a vacuum in the middle of Europe. For nature a vacuum may be something to be abhorred. For Communist imperialism it is something to be filled and exploited.

A second alternative would be to do nothing, continuing as long as possible the present arrangements and hoping that something would turn up. This would be a futile and negative course. What turned up would probably be a Germany, increasing in power, with growing national feeling, taking advantage of every opportunity to end the occupation. At best such a policy would leave an increasingly resentful Germany. At worst, the results might be reminiscent of the thirties.