

became clear that the US was prepared to go along with the briefings, and the rest of the Western European and Others Group (WEOG) was extremely positive about the initiative. While President of the SC, NZ called a large number of meetings so that now it is accepted practice albeit at the discretion of the President. Another weakness is that the meetings occur in a large room with all of the delegations facing a podium from which the SG or his representative gives a briefing. This group dynamic does not foster a round table discussion and easily shifts into countries delivering prepared position statements. In addition, countries are often represented by military representatives who are not comfortable opening up and having a free-ranging discussion in such surroundings.

RECOMMENDATION

Canada should suggest that Troop Contributing Nations meetings become fixed weekly sessions chaired by the USG for peacekeeping or a representative, with additional sessions convened by the USG when necessary. These meetings should take place in a physical environment that lends itself to open and frank discussions aimed at achieving consensus on the most appropriate ways to move forward.

Far from saving the US and the UN money, the US success in reducing UNAMIR I and in delaying the deployment of UNAMIR II inadvertently but undeniably exacerbated the humanitarian crisis and made it necessary for the US itself to spend an estimated 50 times²² what an effective and preventive UN peace enforcement mission would have cost.

Over one month into the crisis, with death counts mounting into the 100,000's, Washington instructed its mission to continue to take a hard stance. During the Security Council debate of 16/17 May, the US felt that Resolution 918 did not sufficiently satisfy their PDD 25 and was flawed without clear commitments from troop/equipment contributors, without the complete consent of parties, and without a refined operations mandate and plan. The US had by this time gained the reputation of obstructing UNAMIR, so that their concerns were too easily dismissed. In fact the objectives set out in SC Res. 918/94 were disjointed and unclear.

Clearly the mandate for an expanded UNAMIR required the use of force to enforce the peace. However Res. 918 did not explicitly state this, and there were several reservations. Paradoxically the US itself added the term "in self-defence", which along with other reservations made the rules of engagement dangerously unclear. The Force Commander (FC) needed but did not get explicit Rules of Engagements (RoEs) which would legitimize the proportional level of force necessary

²² "US Might Have Avoided Rwanda Tragedy", Holly Burkhalter, Washington Director of Human Rights Watch, writing in The Christian Science Monitor, August 9 1994. Burkhalter uses the figure of 50 times and predicates her assessment on the US "conducting extensive humanitarian efforts, including the eventual deployment of thousands of US troops to Rwanda itself and the expenditure of \$250 million in relief assistance." In fact the US deployed almost 5,000 troops in Goma and elsewhere (the US stressed the point that they were not part of UNAMIR).