

the RMA, the problem that it will undermine efforts to control nuclear weapons and other WMDs.

The end of the Cold War made progress in nuclear arms control possible, but it also raised questions about the continued utility of nuclear weapons. Some of those raising these doubts, offer the RMA as the solution. Krepinevich argues that the new military technologies and the nature of post-Cold War threats, "principally regional Bosnia-type ethno-nationalist conflicts or Iraq-type regional conflicts...mean that the utility of the U.S. nuclear arsenal will likely be eclipsed by the capabilities of a host of emerging conventional and electronic weapons." Former State Department Advisor and the author of *Toward a Post-Nuclear Ethic*, Robert Manning, suggests that America's "emerging high-tech" conventional capabilities "point to a sharp de-emphasis of nuclear weapons in U.S. defence planning."⁷⁸

Much has been done to de-emphasize nuclear weapons. Manning cites the INF treaty of 1987, the near ninety per cent reductions in American and Russian arsenals under the START treaties, the Nunn-Lugar program, the indefinite extension of the NPT and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, (CTBT) as reasons for optimism.⁷⁹

The nuclear complications of the RMA are part of the larger WMD problem. Along with the hopes and confidence inspired in America by the RMA, its doctrine and efforts at new military organization, has come what Gongora calls "the nightmarish prospect of asymmetric conflicts." Manning, refers to a new "wave of proliferation" brought about by the very success of the Gulf War, arguing that countries "who lack major power allies and are faced with overwhelming conventional force may seek utility in the logic of deterrence that guided the superpowers in the Cold War."⁸⁰ Bates and McHorney state explicitly that the "dominance of the American military may...actually *encourage* the acquisition and use" of WMD.⁸¹ Moreover in considering the arms control implications of the RMA, it is important to examine the "complex links between the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the trade in conventional weapons."⁸²

As German scholar, Oliver Thrant notes, the proliferation of biological weapons to countries in the southern hemisphere "might give the later the idea that they can use such weapons

⁷⁸ Manning, "The Nuclear Age:," p. 74.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.* p. 72.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.* p. 79.

⁸¹ Bates and McHorney, *Developing a Theoretical Model of Counterproliferation*, p. 31. (Emphasis in original).

⁸² Joanna Spear review of *Managing Non-Proliferation Regimes in the 1990s: Power, Politics and Policies* by Peter Van Ham (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1994), in *Contemporary Security Policy* (17) (December 1996), p. 457.