

established its national mine clearance authority which, when operational, was expected to take at least seven to ten years to complete its work.⁹¹

Observations:

The ONUMOZ experience in Mozambique demonstrates the negative consequences of an unrealistically early deadline for the completion of the disarmament and demobilization phase on the one hand and the danger in keeping ex-combatants in the cantonments too long on the other. It underscores the heavy resource requirements -- both human and financial -- for a successful DDRP and the difficulty in designing an effective programme even where a great deal of advance effort goes into determining the needs and the capacities of the ex-combatants. One of the many lessons learned from Angola which was successfully applied by UNOMOZ was the need for sufficient peacekeepers to make the demobilization process a credible one. In Angola UNAVEM had one Blue Helmet for every 333 combatants; in Mozambique the ratio was one in ten.⁹²

The issue of the timing of demobilization in relation to the creation of the unified national defence force remains problematic, particularly if there is little desire among the ex-combatants to stay in the new force. Other countries have experienced the opposite problem, with so many opting in that the new force places an undue financial burden on fragile post-war economies.⁹³ At the very least, the ONUMOZ experience demonstrates the need to determine as early as possible in the planning process whether the expectations of the party leaders as to the future composition of the unified force accord with those of the combatants themselves.

One of the key's to the success that ONUMOZ was able to achieve was its broad mandate which provided for the creation of effective mechanisms both to coordinate the activities of the diverse range of actors involved in the peace implementation process and to resolve disputes and make adjustments in light of changed circumstances. In addition to the decision by the Cease-fire Commission to postpone the elections, other important adjustments included the UN taking over Chairmanship of the deadlocked Commission responsible for the formation of the

⁹¹ UN Blue Book, Volume V, *ibid.*, pp. 52-53, paras. 180-184.

⁹² *The World Bank Discussion Paper* No. IDP-130, "Demobilization and Reintegration of Military Personnel in Africa: The Evidence from Seven Country Case Studies", October 1993 at p. 41, Table IV.1.

⁹³ *The World Bank Discussion Paper, ibid.*, at p.101. See also the difficulties in general that have been experienced by countries seeking to create a unified defence force in post-conflict situations, as discussed by Berdal, *op cit.*, at pp. 51-53.