

liaison with the Convention's international secretariat in The Hague. Canada is also working to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the implementation of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) through multilateral efforts and national measures.

Canada is increasingly concerned over missile proliferation, especially the continued rise in the number of indigenous development programs and new exporters. Consequently, we have been deeply involved in developing the draft International Code of Conduct (ICOC) against ballistic missile proliferation and are convinced that it could evolve into the first normative multilateral agreement on restraint of ballistic missiles. As part of Canada's commitment to ensuring responsible trade in goods and technology that might be misused to develop weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, we are long-standing participants in several intergovernmental arrangements intended to coordinate and exchange information on exports, including the Australia Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee.

## **Export Control Policy and Implementation**

Control over exports of our own military goods and technology is an important complement to Canada's broader arms control and disarmament efforts. In line with its international obligations, Canada uses the definition of "military good" found in the International Munitions List developed and maintained by the Wassenaar Arrangement. These are goods that are agreed to be "specially designed or modified for military use." Canada has incorporated the listed goods into its Export Control List (ECL) Group 2 (Munitions). Goods not designed for military use but employing strategically sensitive technologies are identified in a second list (Dual-Use Goods and Technologies) compiled by the Wassenaar Arrangement. Canada has included these goods under ECL Group 1 (Dual Use). Permits are required for the export of any goods captured by Wassenaar's lists regardless of whether the foreign consignee is a private, non-military end-user or a government and/or military end-user. However, many day-to-day civilian goods (such as typewriters, automobiles or civil-certified aircraft) may also be acquired by military end-users. These are not normally subject to export control if not included on the lists maintained by Wassenaar or the other international non-proliferation regimes.

Under current export control policy guidelines, Canada closely controls the export of military goods and technology to countries:

- a) that pose a threat to Canada and its allies;
- b) that are involved in or under imminent threat of hostilities;
- c) that are under UN Security Council sanctions; or