

other States aimed at promoting the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. We note in this connection the initiative of Sweden, which introduced in 1983 a draft treaty of its own. I should like to recall, in connection with that draft, that the USSR delegation stated at the Conference last April that the Soviet Union would be ready, in the course of the working out of a draft treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, to consider the possibility of organizing the exchange of data on the radioactivity of air masses, with the establishment of appropriate international data centres, on the same basis as is envisaged in respect of the seismic data exchange. We are convinced that the international public opinion, the peoples of the world, will be able to force the opponents of disarmament to take, at long last, the path towards curbing and eventually completely halting the nuclear-arms race.

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GDR/Rose

21.8.84

CTB

Mr. President, we have before us the Progress Report on the eighteenth session of the Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events. No doubt, the Group under the Chairmanship of Dr. Dahlman, has done a good job in preparing the technical test concerning the exchange and analysis of Level I data, which shall take place in autumn this year. Documents CD/534 and CD/535, submitted to this Conference on 16 August by the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group, add quite a number of ideas to the material worked out by the Group in previous reports.

They again corroborate my delegation's conclusion concerning the relationship between technical work and negotiations at this Conference on a nuclear-test ban.

Whereas technical work on parts of the verification system, ie. the international exchange of seismic data, is quite advanced, there are no negotiations on a CTBT at present. Nobody can deny, however, that the proposed system for global data exchange is intended to operate on the basis of such a treaty and to serve its purposes. The aim, therefore, is not an international exchange of seismic data per se or in a vacuum, but to facilitate the implementation of a CTBT. The system cannot be set up in the absence of such a treaty, nor can it replace the treaty. From this angle it is obvious that technical work on verification aspects cannot go on endlessly, as if it were an open-ended exercise. The Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts has clarified all relevant questions concerning the international data exchange. Detailed arrangements for the international data exchange could be worked out by the envisaged Expert Committee after the treaty is concluded.

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Belgium/Depasse

21.8.84

CTB

I would not have taken the floor if I had not considered that this morning's statement by the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union called for comment. The representative of the Soviet Union described the emphasis placed by the United States delegation on verification problems as "clumsy camouflage". It stated that the verification of a nuclear-test ban was currently possible, and drew on statements made here by the delegation of Sweden. However, the Belgian delegation is informed by its experts that, under current conditions, it is not possible, with the essential degree of certainty, to distinguish between seismic events and nuclear tests. It also notes that the text of the statement by the Ambassador of Sweden quoted by the representative of the Soviet Union is qualified, as the former stated that "adequate verification measures would probably require some further refinement and testing, but that demands no other scienti-